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INTRODUCTION 
The symposium’s theme of ensuring prisoners’ access to services provides an 
opportunity to explore issues related to prisoners in solitary confinement since 
they experience the most extreme barriers to access. Indeed, the intended effect of 
placement in isolation is to cut off access to most of the services and programs 
that are available to prisoners in the general population.1 Following decades of 
growth in the numbers of prisoners confined in isolation, a new campaign to end 
the use of solitary confinement in America’s prisons has coalesced in recent years.2 
This campaign has already achieved considerable success in revealing isolated 
confinement as an unreasonably dangerous form of punishment that violates core 
concepts of human dignity.3 American prisons appear to be approaching a tipping 
point in which a prison practice that has been almost universally accepted in this 
country may lose its perceived status as a legitimate form of confinement. 
If delegitimizing the use of solitary confinement is now a realistic possibility, 
that fact raises new questions for the campaign to end this scourge. Those 
marching under the banner of reform have ranged from prison commissioners4 to 
community activists, including former prisoners and their families.5 The former 
 
1. Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, In States That “Reduce” Their Use of Solitary Confinement, 
Suffering Continues for Those Left Behind, SOLITARY WATCH (Nov. 13, 2013), http://solitarywatch
.com/2013/11/13/states-reduced-use-solitary-confinement-suffering-continues-left-behind. 
2. See Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, How Many Prisoners Are in Solitary Confinement in the United 
States?, SOLITARY WATCH (Feb. 1, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/02/01/how-many 
-prisoners-are-in-solitary-confinement-in-the-united-states. 
3. While a number of organizations have contributed to the success of the campaign, its nerve 
center is Solitary Watch. Solitary Watch describes itself as 
a web-based project aimed at bringing the widespread use of solitary confinement out of 
the shadows and into the light of the public square. [Its] mission is to provide the public—
as well as practicing attorneys, legal scholars, law enforcement and corrections officers, 
policymakers, educators, advocates, people in prison and their families—with the first 
centralized source of unfolding news, original reporting, firsthand accounts, and 
background research on solitary confinement in the United States. 
See About, SOLITARY WATCH, http://solitarywatch.com/about (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). One 
measure of the growing success of the movement is the willingness of some corrections officials to 
speak out against isolated confinement and take steps to reduce it substantially. See infra text 
accompanying notes 4, 6. 
4. See, e.g., Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety 
Consequences: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Humans Rights, 
113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Horn Testimony] (statement of Martin F. Horn and Michael B. 
Mushlin), available at http://solitarywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Written-Testimony-of-
Martin-F.-Horn-and-Michael-B.-Mushlin-to-Sentate-Judiciary-Committee-Subcommittee-Hearing-on-
Solitary-II-February-2014-the.pdf. In this statement, Mr. Horn, the former head of the Pennsylvania 
and New York City Departments of Corrections, calls for “a drastic cutback” in the use of isolation. 
Id. at 3–4; see also Erica Goode, After 20 Hours in Solitary Confinement, Colorado’s Prison Chief Wins Praise, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2014, at A16 (noting that both the current and previous head of Colorado 
Department of Corrections believed that solitary confinement is substantially overused in the nation’s 
prisons). 
5. See, e.g., Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety 
Consequences: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Humans Rights, 
113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Thibodeaux Testimony] (statement of Damon A. Thibodeaux), available 
at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/02-25-14ThibodeauxTestimony.pdf. Mr. 
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tend to phrase their goals in terms of reducing overuse of isolation;6 the latter 
generally seek something closer to complete abolition.7 As the campaign continues 
to build momentum, however, it is increasingly apparent that the current coalition 
in support of reform obscures internal divisions between the reformers and the 
abolitionists.8 Many of the correctional officials who have agreed that the use of 
isolation should be reduced have carefully not foresworn any use of isolation.9 In 
contrast, the codirector of Solitary Watch criticized aspects of a Senate hearing on 
isolated confinement in March 2014 as too likely to leave many prisoners 
subjected to conditions that resemble torture.10 
Litigation challenging the use of isolated confinement is at the same 
crossroads. To date, essentially all of the litigation successes have come from 
challenges to the imposition of isolated confinement on behalf of particularly 
vulnerable groups. For many of these vulnerable groups, the legal theories have 
resulted in a substantial body of precedents supporting their claims. While this 
litigation has achieved important results, so far there are no examples of successful 
litigation attacking isolated confinement across the board. This Article, after a 
brief review of the American roots of the practice of isolated confinement, will 
discuss the status of litigation challenges to isolation on behalf of particularly 
vulnerable groups, because any future litigation strategy will have to contend with 
the body of case law from that litigation. In addition, in a number of jurisdictions, 
in the short term, litigation targeted at vulnerable groups may be the most that can 
be successfully pursued, and such litigation is highly valuable in its own right to 
the extent that it provides a remedy to some of those in isolation. Nonetheless, the 
long-term litigation goal must be ending isolated confinement. Finally, this Article 
 
Thibodeaux spent fifteen years in solitary confinement for a murder for which he was subsequently 
exonerated, and testified that no one should be placed in solitary confinement. Id. at 1, 5. 
6. See Horn Testimony, supra note 4; Goode, supra note 4. 
7. See Thibodeaux Testimony, supra note 5, at 5. 
8. See Jean Casella, Way Down in the Hole: Senate Hearing Challenges Solitary Confinement for Some, 
but Not All, SOLITARY WATCH (March 5, 2014), http://solitarywatch.com/2014/03/05/way-hole 
-Senate-hearing-confirms-growing-opposition-solitary-confinement-prisoners. Ms. Casella, a 
codirector and co-editor-in-chief of Solitary Watch, criticized some of the elected officials and 
correctional officials who had supported reform without endorsing abolition of solitary, writing that 
“[b]y sending the message that incarcerated individuals fall into two groups—those who deserve relief 
from the torturous effects of solitary confinement and those who do not—it may also have the effect 
of driving some people even deeper into the hole.” Id. Ms. Casella also noted that the policy did have 
pragmatic advantages, as it promised to relieve the suffering of many of those now subject to this 
practice, and that it would have more appeal to politicians and the general public than would an 
abolition status. 
9. See Horn Testimony, supra note 4; Goode, supra note 4. Indeed, Christopher Epps, the 
Commissioner for the Mississippi Department of Corrections, who had received substantial praise 
from reformers for agreeing to a settlement that greatly reduced the use of isolation in the supermax 
unit of Parchman State Prison, continues to face litigation regarding conditions in isolation elsewhere 
in the system. See Erica Goode, Seeing Squalor and Unconcern in a Mississippi Jail, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
2014, at 1; Jerry Mitchell, East Mississippi Prison Called Barbaric, CLARION-LEDGER (Sept. 25, 2014, 
9:35 PM CDT), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/09/25/east-mississippi-prison 
-called-barbaric/16242399. 
10. See Casella, supra note 8. 
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discusses why courts have, so far, shown so little willingness to require an end to 
isolation and provides some suggestions about what a future litigation strategy 
aimed at abolition could look like, including some initial suggestions on the 
components that would have to be in place for such litigation to succeed in 
eliminating rather than simply circumscribing this scourge. 
I. A MAP WITH FUZZY BOUNDARIES 
The definition of “solitary confinement” or “isolated confinement” is 
intrinsically fuzzy because the details of solitary confinement vary across many 
dimensions. There is no standard definition of solitary confinement; prison 
officials generally prefer more antiseptic terms such as “administrative 
segregation” or “special management unit.”11 The core concept of solitary 
confinement, however, is captured in the Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the 
Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment: 
There is no universally agreed upon definition of solitary confinement. 
The Istanbul Statement on the Use and Effects of Solitary Confinement 
defines solitary confinement as the physical isolation of individuals who 
are confined to their cells for 22 to 24 hours a day. In many jurisdictions, 
prisoners held in solitary confinement are allowed out of their cells for 
one hour of solitary exercise a day. Meaningful contact with other people 
is typically reduced to a minimum. The reduction in stimuli is not only 
quantitative but also qualitative. The available stimuli and the occasional 
social contacts are seldom freely chosen, generally monotonous, and 
often not empathetic.12 
The Supreme Court provides another useful description of solitary 
confinement in its opinion in Wilkinson v. Austin,13 involving a challenge to solitary 
confinement at the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), a supermax facility. The Court 
noted that incarceration at OSP was “synonymous with extreme isolation” and 
that its conditions were more restrictive than those at any other Ohio prison, 
 
11. See, e.g., Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety 
Consequences: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 
113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Hope Metcalf, Director of the Arthur Liman Public Interest 
Program & Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law), available at http://www.solitarywatch
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Liman-Senate-Statement-Reassessing-Solitary-Confinement 
-Resnik-Metcalf-final-Feb-28-2014.pdf. 
12. See Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur 
of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 25, 
U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 11, 2011) (by Juan E. Méndez) (summarizing declarations from the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, various Committees of the organization, the European 
Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that solitary confinement in 
certain conditions may constitute torture or otherwise violate international law). 
13. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005). The Court in Wilkinson held that procedural 
due process was required in light of the highly restrictive conditions of confinement and the indefinite 
length of confinement at the facility, as well as the fact that prisoners confined there were not eligible 
for parole consideration. Id. at 223–24; see also infra Section V. 
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including other units that the Court described as involving “highly restrictive 
form[s] of solitary confinement.”14 Prisoners at OSP were locked in their cells 
twenty-three hours a day, with cell lights on continually.15 Special steps were taken 
to prevent communications among prisoners, and visiting opportunities were 
rare.16 Meals were eaten alone in the cells.17 The conditions described by the 
Supreme Court in Wilkinson seem to be generally typical of segregation units, with 
the exception that most such units do not routinely prevent prisoners from talking 
to prisoners in neighboring cells,18 many but not all segregation units keep cell 
lights on continually,19 and the amount of out-of-cell time varies slightly in 
segregation units.20 While some units provide prisoners with more out-of-cell 
time, in other units, the average in-cell time is more than twenty-three hours a 
day.21 The size of the cells differs, and cells also differ in whether they possess a 
solid door, a door with a window, or sometimes even a window facing the outside 
through which the prisoner can see the sky.22 Segregation units also vary in the 
amount and type of property they contain, such as books, magazines, and radios, 
and in how those rules affect the extent of isolation.23 Further, in my experience, 
segregation units differ across a range of factors that are difficult to quantify, 
including the tone of the relationships between custody staff and prisoners, the 
responsiveness of medical and mental health staff, the degree of sanitation and the 
upkeep of mechanical systems, the typical decibel level, and the nutritional quality 
 




18. This statement is based on my personal experience with segregation units or supermax 
facilities, or both, in prisons operated in Alabama, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
19. For a description of prison segregation units that keep lights on continually, see Grenning 
v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2013), which discusses continuously illuminated cells 
with four-foot long fluorescent tubes. 
20. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 757–58 (7th Cir. 1997) (alleging that ordinary 
segregation routine was twenty-four hours per day in cell); Vasquez v. Braemer, No. 11-cv-806-bbc, 
2013 WL 4084284, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2013) (noting that segregated prisoners are confined in 
cell twenty-three or twenty-four hours per day); Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, 
Ind. Dept. of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317, 2012 WL 6738517, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (noting 
policy for all segregation units in state to provide segregated prisoners with a minimum of one hour 
and fifteen minutes out of cell daily); Letter from Tom Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S., & 
David J. Hickton, U.S. Att’y, W. Dist. of Pa., to Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa. 3–4 (May 31, 2013) 
(informing Pennsylvania Governor that conditions for seriously mentally ill and cognitively disabled 
prisoners at SCI-Cresson violate the Eighth Amendment; prisoners are in their cells approximately 
twenty-two hours per day). 
21. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18. 
22. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18. 
23. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN: THE TRUE COST OF EXTREME 
ISOLATION IN NEW YORK’S PRISONS 9, 28, 37–39 (2012), available at http://www.nyclu.org 
/files/publications/nyclu_boxedin_FINAL.pdf (referring to various property restrictions in New 
York solitary confinement units); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 531–32 (2006) (plurality 
opinion) (depriving Level 2 prisoners in a long-term segregation unit of their access to newspapers, 
magazines, and personal photographs was within prison’s discretion). 
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of the food.24 Finally, of course, as the Supreme Court noted, the length of time 
spent in solitary confinement substantially affects the severity of the experience.25 
II. A SHORT AND SUPERFICIAL HISTORY OF ISOLATION IN AMERICA 
There is great irony in the contemporary attack on isolated confinement in 
American prisons given the history of the practice. In the late eighteenth century, 
prisons scarcely existed in the United States.26 Instead, most penal facilities (as 
distinct from workhouses for the poor) were jails for those awaiting trial or the 
execution of sentence, since sentences to confinement were rare while crimes 
punishable by death or corporal punishment were common.27 
In the early nineteenth century, a reform movement in the United States and 
Europe attempted to put into practice the ideas of Enlightenment thinkers that 
institutions should be consciously designed to promote the general social 
welfare.28 Out of this general intellectual ferment came a focus on prison reform.29 
Drawing upon the writings of European thinkers, including Montesquieu and 
Beccaria, the reformers sought to design prisons that avoided unnecessary cruelty, 
yet would lead prisoners to turn away from criminal behavior following release.30 
In the United States, prominent Quakers led the reform movement mixing 
Enlightenment ideas with religious convictions.31 The first attempt to create a 
prison reflecting these ideas resulted in the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, 
where the reformers envisioned confining prisoners in single cells so they would 
 
24. See supra text accompanying note 18. For an example of reports of extreme conditions of 
confinement in an isolation facility, see Class Action Complaint, Dockery v. Epps, No. 3:13-cv-
00326-TSL-JMR (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/emcf
_complaint_filed_5.30.13.pdf. 
25. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005) (finding that prisoners have a due 
process interest in avoiding confinement at OSP, in part because of the indefinite length of 
confinement there). The Court assumed that most other solitary confinement facilities did not impose 
indefinite lengths of confinement, but this assumption is questionable. Although most state policies 
on administrative segregation purport to have some process for periodic review of the prisoner’s 
assignment to that status, the standards for that review are frequently so vague that, for practical 
purposes, such assignment is indefinite in length. For example, the original policy for determining 
which prisoners would be transferred to OSP simply provided that the prisoner “has demonstrated 
behavior which meets high maximum security criteria” or “presents the highest level of threat to the 
security and order of the department, in the professional judgment of the classifying official.” See 
Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 731 (N.D. Ohio 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 372 F.3d 
346 (6th Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
26. Harry Elmer Barnes, Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 35, 36–37 (1921). 
27. DE BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note * at 37–39; Barnes, supra note 26, at 37. 
28. Barnes, supra note 26, at 40–42. 
29. Thorsten Sellin, Introduction to DE BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note *, at xix–
xx. 
30. The Eastern State Prison was built on an architectural model similar to Bentham’s concept 
of the Panopticon, based on a central guard tower surrounded by a circular prison. See Barnes, supra 
note 26, at 44–45. 
31. See Sellin, supra note 29, at xx, xxviii; Barnes, supra note 26, at 37–38. 
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be isolated from all other prisoners.32 This concept of imposing complete isolation 
on prisoners became known as the Pennsylvania System.33 After the Walnut Street 
Jail proved to confine too many prisoners for the concept to be implemented as 
planned,34 the Pennsylvania System was then attempted at the new Western State 
Penitentiary.35 Again, its implementation was attended by adverse effects on the 
physical and mental health of the prisoners.36 Nonetheless, the reformers pressed 
on and were ultimately successful in designing the Eastern State Prison in 
Philadelphia.37 By legislative mandate, the new prison that was intended to carry 
out a modified Pennsylvania Plan of complete isolation combined with labor 
included features that were quite extraordinary for the time, including flush toilets 
in individual cells, state-of-the-art central heating and sewage systems, and 
individual exercise yards.38 Built in 1836 at a cost of $780,000, the Eastern State 
Penitentiary was one of the most expensive buildings in the country.39 
Many of the design features, such as individual exercise yards and in-cell 
plumbing, were necessitated by the requirement of the Pennsylvania System that 
prisoners be completely isolated from each other.40 Prisoners were to eat, work, 
and reflect on their need for reform within their solitary cells.41 Newspapers, as 
well as correspondence and visits from family members, were barred.42 The 
isolation precautions were so extreme that when a new prisoner walked to his cell, 
a hood was placed over his head to prevent prisoners from learning each other’s 
identities.43 
New York State, influenced by many of the same ideas, sought to implement 
the concepts of the reform movement when it opened Newgate Prison in 
Greenwich Village at the end of the eighteenth century.44 The resulting prison, 
however, suffered from many of the same defects as the Walnut Street Jail, 
 
32. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 48–49. 
33. Id. at 48. 
34. See DE BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note *, at 37–38; Barnes, supra note 26, at 
48–49. 
35. See Norman B. Johnston, John Haviland, in PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY 107, 110 
(Hermann Mannheim ed., 2d ed. 1972) (recounting reform efforts to create Eastern State 
Penitentiary). 
36. Id. at 111. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 111, 115 (noting that the legislative mandate for the prison included a requirement 
that prisoners work, and the inclusion of flush toilets and individual exercise yards); History of Eastern 
State: Timeline, E. ST. PENITENTIARY, http://www.easternstate.org/learn/timeline (last visited Aug. 
24, 2014) (noting that the prison included state-of-the-art plumbing, sewage systems, and central 
heating); see also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 82 (rev. ed. 1990) (noting 
that according to the blueprint for the Eastern State Penitentiary, prisoners were to eat, work, and 
sleep in their individual cells). 
39. History of Eastern State: Timeline, supra note 38. 
40. See ROTHMAN, supra note 38, at 82; Johnston, supra note 35, at 111. 
41. ROTHMAN, supra note 38, at 85. 
42. Id. at 85, 95. 
43. Id. at 85. 
44. Barnes, supra note 26, at 51. 
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including congregate housing and a lack of classification.45 The facility was widely 
acknowledged to be a failure after escapes, riots, and prisoner deaths in the 
overcrowded facility became common.46 
The next attempt at reform in New York involved the Auburn State Prison. 
Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont described the first results: 
The northern wing having been nearly finished in 1821, eighty prisoners 
were placed there, and a separate cell was given to each. This trial, from 
which so happy a result had been anticipated, was fatal to the greater part 
of the convicts.47 In order to reform them, they had been submitted to 
complete isolation; but this absolute solitude, if nothing interrupts it, is 
beyond the strength of man; it destroys the criminal without intermission 
and without pity; it does not reform, it kills. 
. . . . 
This experiment, so fatal to those who were selected to undergo it, was of 
a nature to endanger the success of the penitentiary system altogether. 
After the melancholy effects of isolation, it was to be feared that the 
whole principle would be rejected: it would have been a natural 
reaction.48 
As a result of the obvious failures with the first real attempt to test the 
Pennsylvania System, the prison implemented a modified version that became 
known as the Auburn System, in which prisoners slept in single cells but worked 
and ate in groups.49 This modification made the system less expensive and 
eliminated the problem of finding work that prisoners could engage in while in 
their cells.50 Nonetheless, the basic concept of the Pennsylvania System as 
implemented at Auburn was the same: prisoners were still forbidden to engage in 
any conversation with each other, and prisoners could be severely punished for 
violations of the rules.51 Despite the fact that solitary confinement had initially 
been viewed as a reform of barbaric practices, the custom began to elicit criticism 
that it was far more likely to harm than to rehabilitate a prisoner. In 1842, Charles 
Dickens toured the Eastern State Penitentiary and condemned what he saw: 
 
45. Id. at 52. 
46. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY 
TO 1898, at 505 (1999); SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF 
IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 95, 99 (1998). 
47. As the authors note in an omitted portion of this passage, five prisoners in the unit died in 
a one-year period, and another attempted suicide. DE BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note *, 
at 41. 
48. Id. at 41–42. The authors were not condemning all policies that they characterized as 
involving solitary confinement. Significantly, however, they classified regimens that do not resemble 
current isolation practices as solitary confinement. See, e.g., id. at 45 (referring to the “happy success” 
of a revised form of the Auburn system that imposed “isolation by night, with common labor during 
the day”). 
49. Barnes, supra note 26, at 53–54. 
50. Id. at 56–57; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 38, at 86–88. 
51. ROTHMAN, supra note 38, at 97, 101–02. 
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In its intention, I am well convinced that it is kind, humane, and meant 
for reformation; but I am persuaded that those who devised this system 
of Prison Discipline, and those benevolent gentlemen who carry it into 
execution, do not know what it is that they are doing. I believe that very 
few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and 
agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon 
the sufferers.52 
It is particularly striking that Dickens’ observations are so similar to those of 
modern observers of isolated confinement. Dickens noted that every cell had 
double doors, an outer door of oak, and an inner door of grated iron. The grated 
door had “a trap through which his food is handed.”53 Dickens noted that some 
of the prisoners reddened at the sight of visitors, and others turned very pale.54 
Two or three were very sick, including a man whose leg had been amputated in 
prison.55 One was an African American youth; only Caucasians were eligible for a 
less harsh program for children.56 Another prisoner, who had spent eleven years in 
solitary and would be released in a few months, did not respond to Dickens’ 
attempt to engage him in conversation.57 Instead, he stared at his hands and 
“pick[ed] the flesh upon his fingers,” doing so “as though he were bent on parting 
skin and bone.”58 Prominent penologists of the nineteenth century also “had little 
respect for the Pennsylvania and Auburn principles.”59 
Over time, solitary confinement became a status typically assigned to 
prisoners who were sentenced for crimes deemed especially heinous or who were 
being punished for misconduct within the prison system. In 1890, the Supreme 
Court granted, on ex post facto grounds, a petition for habeas corpus from a 
prisoner who was subjected to solitary confinement pending execution under a 
state statute that had not existed at the time of his crime.60 In the course of the 
Court’s opinion, it briefly mentioned the Philadelphia System and summarized the 
effects of solitary confinement: 
The peculiarities of this system were the complete isolation of the 
prisoner from all human society, and his confinement in a cell of 
considerable size, so arranged that he had no direct intercourse with or 
 
52. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES AND PICTURES FROM ITALY 97–98 (Chapman 
& Hall Ltd. ed., 1907) (1842). 
53. Id. at 99–100. 




58. Id. at 102–03. Prisoners who deliberately cut themselves are a well-known feature of 
contemporary isolation units. See Fatos Kaba et al., Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail 
Inmates, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 442, 445 (2014) (reporting results of a study among detainees 
confined in the New York City Jail (Riker’s Island), and finding that detainees assigned to solitary 
confinement were almost seven times more likely to commit acts of self-harm when results were 
controlled for length of stay). 
59. ROTHMAN, supra note 38, at 251. 
60. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 166 (1890). 
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sight of any human being, and no employment or instruction. . . . But 
experience demonstrated that there were serious objections to it. A 
considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, 
into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to 
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed 
suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally 
reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to 
be of any subsequent service to the community.61 
Into this century, variants of solitary confinement remained a feature 
primarily used to punish prisoners for misbehavior during their sentence, although 
death row prisoners continued in most states to be housed in separate death rows 
that often differed little, if at all, from the conditions imposed in disciplinary 
confinement.62 In the 1980s and 1990s, as prison populations skyrocketed,63 
separate facilities called “supermaxes,” designed for isolated confinement, gained 
popularity.64 No longer was the purpose of solitary confinement assumed to be 
rehabilitation; now the primary goal was control.65 The supermaxes were intended 
to aid prison management by separating out the “bad apples,” so that the bulk of 
the prisoners could be more easily managed.66 Opening a supermax may generally 
result in a substantial increase in the number of prisoners subjected to isolated 
confinement.67 There is little empirical evidence, however, that this strategy 
 
61. Id. at 168. 
62. See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, COMM’N ON SAFETY & 
ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 54 (2006) (noting that prisoners 
are placed in segregation for disciplinary reasons or because the prisoners are considered either 
dangerous or at risk if placed in the general population); Sandra Babcock, Death Row Conditions 
( June 2006), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row (follow “Death Row 
Conditions” link) (indicating that the great majority of death row units confine prisoners under 
conditions characteristic of isolated confinement, with cell lockdown for twenty-three or more hours 
a day, solid cell doors, and restricted access to programming, including family visits); see also Mark D. 
Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical 
Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 191, 204 (2002) (noting that, despite some variability, 
death row conditions in the United States are characterized by isolation and restricted movement). 
63. Between 1970 and 2010 the population of U.S. prisons rose more than 700%. THE PEW 
CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010, at 1 (2010). 
64. See DANIEL P. MEARS, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPERMAX PRISONS 1, 
40 (2006) (noting that in 1984 there was one supermax prison in the country, but by 1999, two-thirds 
of the states operated a supermax prison, and by 2004, forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
operated a supermax prison). 
65. Id. at 1, 5 (noting that the primary rationale offered by correctional officials for 
supermaxes is that they provide protection of staff and other prisoners, either directly by preventing 
violence instigated by the worst prisoners, or because the incapacitation of the worst prisoners makes 
it easier to stop other prisoners from violent acts). 
66. Id. at 1. 
67. See id. at 40 (noting that a conservative estimate of the number of prisoners confined in 
supermaxes, as of 2004, was 25,000, and a high estimate was 80,000). This number is in addition to 
the number of prisoners in isolated confinement in facilities other than supermaxes. In fact, there is 
evidence that after a supermax is constructed, prisoners are sometimes assigned there based on the 
availability of beds rather than the prisoners’ assessed need for such confinement. See, e.g., Austin v. 
Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723–24 (N.D. Ohio 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 372 F.3d 346 (6th 
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reduces system-wide levels of violence.68 An evaluation of the effectiveness of 
supermax confinement in the Arizona, Illinois, and Minnesota correctional 
systems found that operating a supermax did not reduce the level of prisoner-on-
prisoner violence in any of the systems.69 Only in Illinois did the existence of a 
supermax appear to reduce the level of prisoner-on-staff violence.70 Indeed, the 
level of prison violence appears to have increased within the California 
Department of Corrections, despite the use of the isolation units.71 
The number of prisoners in the nation who are confined in isolation, 
whether in a supermax or a special unit within a traditional prison, has been 
estimated to be as high as 80,000.72 Thus, the continuing popularity of supermaxes 
has contributed substantially to the numbers of prisoners who experience isolated 
confinement, even as the total number of prisoners has fallen slightly very 
recently.73 One reason for these large numbers is the variety of rationales that 
prison administrators have given for confining prisoners in isolation. Most 
prisoners are in isolated confinement because they have violated a prison rule or 
because they are viewed as a threat to prison security.74 A prisoner may also be 
assigned supermax confinement because the prisoner is under a sentence of death, 
is a youthful offender, is at risk of attack by others, is seriously mentally ill, or has 
a major medical problem.75 In fact, not only have these characteristics led to 
prisoners being assigned to isolation, but they have also resulted in litigation 
challenging the restrictive nature of that confinement.76 The various legal theories 
 
Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (noting that, prior to the construction of 
Ohio’s supermax, the state did not fill all the beds available in the system’s most restrictive housing 
unit, while it had a shortage of beds at the next-most restrictive security level). 
68. See GIBBONS & DE B. KATZENBACH, supra note 62, at 54. 
69. Id. (citing Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effects of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate Levels 
of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341 (2003)). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See MEARS, supra note 64, at 40. The estimated population of U.S. prisoners confined in 
solitary approaches the total number of prisoners reported by the British government in November 
2013 of 84,592. Ministry of Justice, Monthly Bulletin-November 2013 (Nov. 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prison-population-figures (follow “Population 
Bulletin - Monthly November 2013” link). 
73. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. PRISON POPULATION DECLINED FOR THIRD 
CONSECUTIVE YEAR DURING 2012 (2012), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press
/p12acpr.cfm (indicating that the total prison population of the United States dropped by about 1.7% 
in 2012, to an estimated 1,571,013 prisoners; prison populations had increased every year from 1978 
to 2009). 
74. See MEARS, supra note 64, at app. tbl.4 (describing wardens’ responses to a survey about 
which prisoners were in supermax confinement and which prisoners should be; the great majority of 
reasons given for both sets of responses involved rule violations, security threats, or both). 
75. Id. The survey does not appear to distinguish between characteristics that by themselves 
justify placement in isolated confinement and characteristics that merely do not exclude a prisoner 
from such placement. 
76. Youthful offenders and other persons whom staff perceive as unsafe in general population 
can be sent to protective custody units that are operated as segregation units. See Sharon Dolovich, 
Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.8 (2011) (noting that gay men 
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that have resulted in exclusions of members of these groups shed light on the 
prospects for a broader attack on the practice of isolation. 
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
The most familiar and arguably most successful rationale for excluding a 
particular group of prisoners from isolated confinement involves the Eighth 
Amendment bar to cruel and unusual punishment. Challenges to prisoners’ 
conditions of confinement generally arise under the Eighth Amendment, and the 
same standard applies to such challenges whether the claim involves medical care 
or other prison conditions of confinement.77 The standard involves both an 
objective and a subjective component.78 A violation of the objective component 
can be demonstrated by showing a serious deprivation of a basic human need, 
such as medical care or reasonable safety.79 In addition, the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.80 Unreasonable risks of 
serious damage to a prisoner’s future health or safety can violate the objective 
component of the Eighth Amendment, even if the damage has not yet occurred 
and may not affect all prisoners subjected to the risk.81 Proof of the subjective 
component of an Eighth Amendment violation with regard to prison conditions 
requires a showing of “deliberate indifference.”82 Such a demonstration requires, 
in the context of a prison conditions of confinement claim, proof that the 
defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”83 
A. Challenges on Behalf of Seriously Mentally Ill Prisoners 
Mentally ill prisoners are common in large part because the United States 
lacks an effective system to provide treatment for those with psychiatric disorders 
in the community.84 Since the 1960s, public facilities providing inpatient mental 
health treatment have become an endangered species.85 Because these facilities 
 
and transgendered women, as well as other prisoners perceived as vulnerable, including youth, are 
frequently placed in protective custody, a form of segregation). Most prisoners in protective custody 
have either actively sought that status, or understandably do not wish to challenge it if the alternative 
is a general population unit in which they are in danger. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 
412 (1st Cir. 1977) (considering a challenge to conditions of confinement in a prison where all 
assignments to protective custody were voluntary). 
77. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). 
78. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
79. See id. at 832. 
80. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
81. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 
82. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
83. Id. 
84. The numbers of inpatient state hospital beds available for psychiatric patients dropped 
from 339 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 1955 to 22 per 100,000 in 2000. H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. 
Weinberger, The Shift of Psychiatric Inpatient Care from Hospitals to Jails and Prisons, 33 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 529, 529 (2005). 
85. Id. at 530–32 (stating that many mentally ill people are processed by the criminal justice 
system due to a lack of alternatives in the mental health system). 
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were not replaced by programs offering outpatient services, the criminal justice 
system has become, by default, the system for the provision of services to the 
seriously mentally ill.86 Once in prison, the vulnerabilities of the seriously mentally 
ill put them at increased risk of isolated confinement because they have difficulty 
conforming their conduct to the disciplinary rules in the restrictive prison 
environment.87 Assignment to a segregation unit then adds substantial stress.88 A 
psychiatrist who extensively studied the effects of solitary confinement on the 
mentally ill has identified a number of symptoms that many mentally ill prisoners 
assigned to segregation developed: hypersensitivity to external stimuli; perceptual 
distortions; panic attacks; difficulties with thinking, concentration, and memory; 
intrusive, obsessional thoughts; overt paranoia; and problems with impulse 
control—comprising a psychiatric syndrome.89 
These particular vulnerabilities of the seriously mentally ill in isolation played 
an important role in spurring the campaign against isolated confinement.90 A 
Human Rights Watch report, for example, quoted this description of a mentally ill 
prisoner confined in a supermax facility in Indiana: 
Prisoner Brown . . . has had seizures and psychiatric symptoms since 
childhood. He has bipolar disorder and a severe anxiety disorder, a 
phobia about being alone in a cell, and many features of chronic post-
traumatic stress disorder. After he has been in his cell for a while, his 
anxiety level rises to an unbearable degree, turning into a severe panic 
attack replete with palpitations, sweating, difficulty breathing, and 
accompanying perceptual distortions and cognitive confusion. He 
mutilates himself—for example, by inserting paper clips completely into 
his abdomen—to relieve his anxiety and to be removed from his cell for 
medical treatment.91 
Evidence, such as this report by a psychiatrist, helped fuel the growing 
concern that solitary confinement of the seriously mentally ill is unacceptably 
dangerous. One manifestation of that concern was the action of the American Bar 
 
86. Id. It is particularly noteworthy that during the same period that the number of mental 
health beds in the community plummeted, the number of the mentally ill in prison exploded so that 
now the number of mentally ill in prisons is nearly five times the number in state mental hospitals. Id. 
at 529–30 (noting that in 2000, the per capita rate of seriously mentally ill prisoners was estimated as 
at least 113 per 100,000 while the rate of such patients in state mental hospitals was 22 per 100,000). 
87. Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A 
Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 105 (2010). 
88. Id. 
89. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 
335–38 (2006). The psychiatric syndrome identified by Dr. Grassian is often referred to as “SHU 
Syndrome,” referring to the common abbreviation for Special Housing Unit, a name frequently used 
by prison systems, including the Massachusetts system studied by Dr. Grassian. See id. 
90. Much of this advocacy campaign is coordinated through Solitary Watch. Its website, 
www.solitarywatch.com, offers a compendium of campaign materials. 
91. SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. 
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 145 (2003) The report notes that this 
description comes from an inmate evaluation completed by Terry Kupers, M.D., in 1997. Id. Dr. 
Kupers has been deeply involved in the campaign against solitary confinement. See infra note 105. 
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Association, which in 2010 adopted a new set of Standards on Treatment of 
Prisoners that included the principle that “[n]o prisoner diagnosed with serious 
mental illness should be placed in long-term segregated housing.”92 Because so 
many of the seriously mentally ill are confined in prison,93 and they suffer so 
profoundly from that confinement,94 the failure to exclude the seriously mentally 
ill from solitary confinement is probably responsible for the largest share of the 
unnecessary deaths among prisoners in isolation.95 
There are already a number of cases in which the Eighth Amendment 
argument for exclusion has succeeded. The first of the significant successful cases 
is Madrid v. Gomez, involving a class-action challenge to the Pelican Bay supermax 
in California.96 The court noted three basic factors that posed a risk to prisoners 
confined there: such prisoners were prone to engage in disruptive behavior, so 
that they were more likely to be assigned to Pelican Bay; the severity of the 
conditions and the restrictions placed upon prisoners caused deterioration among 
mentally ill prisoners; and some prisoners who were not seriously mentally ill 
became seriously mentally ill under the conditions in the prison.97 While the court 
rejected the claim that the extreme social isolation and reduced environmental 
stimulation constituted sufficient harm to violate the Eighth Amendment rights of 
all prisoners assigned to Pelican Bay,98 the court held that prisoners with serious 
mental disorders were at such high risk of severe injury that “placing them in the 
SHU is the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to 
breathe,” so that their placement in the facility violated the Eighth Amendment.99 
A second case in essence expanded the application of the Madrid holding 
 
92. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 23-2.8(a) (2011). The 
American Psychiatric Association adopted a somewhat weaker standard in 2012: “Prolonged 
segregation of adult inmates with serious mental illness, with rare exceptions, should be avoided due 
to the potential for harm to such inmates.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON 
SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2012), available at http://www 
.psychiatry.org/file%20library/learn/archives/ps2012_prisonersegregation.pdf. 
93. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, fifty-six percent of state prisoners and forty-
five percent of federal prisoners have a mental health problem. Among state prisoners, fifteen percent 
report symptoms that meet the criteria for a psychotic disorder, and additional prisoners meet the 
criteria for a major depression or bipolar disorder. About twenty-three percent report symptoms of 
major depression. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL 
REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
94. See infra text accompanying notes 95–101, 128–151. 
95. A high percentage of prisoner suicides take place in isolation. See, e.g., LINDSAY M. HAYES, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON SUICIDE: AN OVERVIEW AND GUIDE TO PREVENTION 55 (1995) 
(noting that sixty-three percent of all suicides in the Bureau of Prisons during a five-year period 
occurred in segregation, administrative segregation, or a psychiatric seclusion unit). In addition, there 
is evidence that a number of deaths in isolation units that are not caused by a prisoner’s intentional 
act result from the interaction of the prisoner’s mental illness and an isolated environment, such as 
some deaths from starvation and from heat illness. See infra text accompanying notes 128–151. 
96. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
97. Id. at 1223. 
98. Id. at 1265. 
99. Id. at 1265–66. 
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throughout the California Department of Corrections, finding that the California 
Department of Corrections inappropriately used disciplinary and behavioral 
control measures on mentally ill prisoners and that mentally ill prisoners were 
placed in segregation without any evaluation of their mental status.100 Of twenty-
four mentally ill prisoners reviewed by one of the plaintiff’s psychiatric experts, 
seven were actively psychotic and needed hospitalization and nine had suffered 
serious reactions to confinement in the SHU, including periods of psychotic 
disorganization in a number of cases.101 Many other cases resulted in relief to 
mentally ill prisoners confined in isolation.102 
One case deserves particular note. Gates v. Cook involved Unit 32, a 
supermax unit of the Mississippi State Prison at Parchman.103 In 2004, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed various items of injunctive relief involving the 
Death Row Unit located within Unit 32, including the order that prisoners 
diagnosed with psychosis were to be transferred out to a specialized unit that 
 
100. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1321 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
101. Coleman resulted in a ruling that mental health care within the California Department of 
Corrections systemically violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1308. The case was subsequently 
consolidated with a statewide challenge to medical care within the California Department of 
Corrections. After the prison system’s prolonged failure to remedy the Eighth Amendment violations 
in mental health, as well as the similar failures to remedy dangerously deficient medical care found in 
another case, a three-judge court ordered a significant reduction in population as the only feasible 
method of addressing the failures. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 1003 (E.D. & 
N.D. Cal. 2009). This remedy was ultimately upheld in Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
102. See, e.g., Matz v. Frank, 340 F. App’x 323 (7th Cir. 2009) (reversing and remanding 
dismissal of Eighth Amendment claims regarding placement in segregation of prisoner with history of 
suicide attempts and serious mental illness); Sardakowski v. Clements, No. 12-cv-01326-RBJ-KLM, 
2013 WL 3296569, at *7 (D. Colo. July 1, 2013) (adopting Magistrate Judge’s report and denying 
motion to dismiss Eighth Amendment claim based on defendants’ placement of plaintiff in 
segregation, where plaintiff’s mental illness was exacerbated); Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n 
v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517, at *15 (S.D. Ind. 
Dec. 31, 2012) (finding that placement of seriously mentally ill in segregation violated Eighth 
Amendment due to defendants’ knowledge of risk of exacerbation of mental illness); Jones’El v. 
Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1125–26 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction requiring 
the removal of certain prisoners from Wisconsin’s supermax facility because of its effect on their 
mental statuses and requiring the screening of prisoners in certain classifications to determine whether 
they also required removal); Goff v. Harper, 59 F. Supp. 2d 910, 923 (S.D. Iowa 1999) (adopting 
remedy for failure to treat seriously mentally ill prisoners in a lock-up unit requiring defendants to 
establish a special needs unit); Perri v. Coughlin, No. 90-cv-1160, 1999 WL 395374, at *1, *11 
(N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1999) (finding that conditions in an isolated confinement unit involving a 
prisoner with serious mental health problems who engaged in self-harm violated the Eighth 
Amendment and awarding damages); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 914–15 (S.D. Tex. 1999), 
rev’d on other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001), adhered to on remand, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 
2001) (finding in a state-wide case that confining the seriously mentally ill in segregation violated the 
Eighth Amendment); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1548–50 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that the 
use of lockdown as an alternative to mental health treatment violated the Eighth Amendment); 
Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 868 (D.D.C. 1989) (prohibiting the confinement of 
seriously mentally ill prisoners in segregation unit); see also Flynn v. Doyle, 672 F. Supp. 2d 858, 860, 
868 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (partially denying summary judgment to defendants on Eighth Amendment 
challenge to conditions that included, inter alia, confining prisoners with serious mental illness in a unit 
that operated as a “minimally staffed special management unit”). 
103. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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would offer meaningful mental health services.104 Following that affirmance, 
prisoners represented by the Gates counsel filed Presley v. Epps, raising similar issues 
about conditions in the rest of Unit 32.105 The parties subsequently settled the 
litigation for relief that included the relief won in Gates, including the removal of 
the seriously mentally ill from isolated confinement.106 The results were dramatic. 
After implementation of the remedy began, the prison officials found that nearly 
eighty percent of the prisoners assigned to the unit did not require such restrictive 
confinement; subsequently the population dropped from about 1000 to the 
approximately 150 prisoners on death row.107 After the implementation of the 
treatment program for the seriously mentally ill who had been held in isolated 
confinement, their rates of disciplinary infractions for a six-month period dropped 
from 4.7 per prisoner to 0.6.108 One feature of Gates is common: challenges to the 
confinement of the seriously mentally ill in isolation frequently end in 
settlement.109 
The broad-based success of challenges to the confinement of the seriously 
mentally ill in segregation is particularly important because it means that one of 
 
104. Id. at 342–43. 
105. Terry Kupers et al., Beyond Supermax Administrative Segregation: Mississippi’s Experience 
Rethinking Prison Classification and Creating Alternative Mental Health Programs, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
1037, 1039–40 (2009). Remarkably, the authors of this article include persons from both sides of the 
litigation, including lawyers, experts, and the Deputy Director of the Mississippi Department of 
Corrections. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1041. 
108. Id. at 1046. 
109. See David C. Fathi, The Common Law of Supermax Litigation, 24 PACE L. REV. 675, 682 n.36 
(2003) (discussing common provisions in settlements in cases involving litigation against supermax 
facilities). One of these cases is Jones’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096. After the preliminary injunction 
was granted in the case, the parties settled for relief that included a continued ban on the housing of 
the seriously mentally ill in the facility, in addition to other changes. See Fathi, supra, at 678 n.13 (citing 
Jones’El v. Berge, No. 00-C-421-C, Ex. A at 5 (W.D. Wis. June 24, 2002)). Similarly, the article’s notes 
discuss two additional settlements with provisions excluding the seriously mentally ill from 
segregation. One is Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-071 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2001), in which a 
prisoner plaintiff class challenging confinement in Ohio’s supermax obtained a preliminary injunction 
barring defendants from returning seriously mentally ill class members to the facility, and a few 
months later, the remaining Eighth Amendment claims settled with an agreement for injunctive relief. 
See Fathi, supra, at 678 n.17. This preliminary injunction involves an earlier stage of the litigation that 
culminated in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, a Supreme Court decision regarding procedural due 
process in decisions involving placement in isolation. The other settlement is Ayers v. Perry, No. 1:02-
cv-01438 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2002), in which a challenge to supermax conditions resulted in settlement 
shortly after filing; the settlement agreement included a prohibition on the confinement of the 
seriously mentally ill at the facility. See Fathi, supra, at 679, 682. Other cases in which an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to solitary confinement resulted in a settlement barring assignment include 
Disability Law Center v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections, 960 F. Supp. 2d 271, 277 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(approving settlement); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 02 Civ. 4002 
(GEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2007), in which a settlement increased therapeutic programming for 
prisoners with serious mental illness subject to confinement sanction, and established new units with 
increased mental health services; and Office of Protection & Advocacy v. Choinski, Civ. No. 3:03CV1352 
(RNC) (D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2004), in which a settlement excluded seriously mentally ill prisoners from 
segregated confinement, with limited exceptions. 
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the biggest barriers to success across the board in closing down isolation can be 
overcome. Courts have been particularly anxious to defer to correctional officials 
when an issue is said to involve their special expertise in security matters.110 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the standard for succeeding in a 
medical care claim brought by a prisoner is substantially lower than the standard 
for succeeding in a claim challenging the use of excessive or unnecessary force 
“because the State’s responsibility to attend to the medical needs of prisoners does 
not ordinarily clash with other equally important governmental responsibilities.”111 
Thus, it is key to the success of cases challenging isolated confinement that 
courts view them, as they should, as cases involving conditions of confinement 
and not through a distorted focus on security. This is another reason why the 
evidence from prison mental health and classification experts concluding that 
curtailing the use of isolation through treatment actually promotes institutional 
security is so critical.112 
As to the specific issue of the danger of confining the seriously mentally ill in 
isolation, however, the battle is pretty much over. The defendants generally 
dispute specific facts, at least until they settle, such as whether the treatment of the 
seriously mentally ill is as bad as plaintiffs claim, or whether a particular prisoner is 
in fact seriously mentally ill.113 Similarly, defendants are likely to claim that they 
have, at least temporarily, removed the seriously mentally ill from solitary 
confinement in order to assert that they are entitled to termination of existing 
orders pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act.114 Nonetheless, challenges to 
 
110. See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230–31 (2001) (“[U]nder [precedent cases], 
prison officials are to remain the primary arbiters of the problems that arise in prison management. 
[C]ourts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and 
reform. . . . Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal advice would undermine prison 
officials’ ability to address the ‘complex and intractable’ problems of prison administration.” 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
111. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (holding that use of force on a prisoner 
did not violate the Eighth Amendment unless the force was used “maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm” (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973))). 
112. See Kupers et al., supra note 105, at 1046–47 (noting evidence that disciplinary incidents 
declined markedly after removal of the seriously mentally ill from isolation). In certain circumstances, 
whether a court views a prisoner challenge as raising a medical issue or a security issue can be 
outcome determinative. See infra text accompanying notes 263–292, 309–314. 
113. See, e.g., Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that the 
defendant’s treatment program already met the standard for mental health treatment set by the 
injunction); Jones‘El, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the prisoner 
plaintiffs were not as seriously mentally ill as plaintiffs claimed). Advocates have noted the tendency 
of prison mental health staff to misdiagnose mental illness as mere manipulation, and therefore claim 
that prisoners can be assigned to isolated confinement without placing them at unreasonable risk. See 
ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 91, at 106–09. Manipulative behavior is not inconsistent with the 
presence of mental illness. Id. at 106. 
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2012) (providing for termination of injunctive orders in prison 
conditions of confinement cases if there is no longer a constitutional violation, among other 
restrictions on the continuation of relief). 
          
18 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:1 
the confinement of the seriously mentally ill in isolation can follow a well-beaten 
path to success. 
B. Challenges Related to Cognitive Disorders115 
A few cases have specifically noted that prisoners with other cognitive 
disorders should be included in the categories of prisoners unsuitable for 
confinement in isolation units. As the Supreme Court recognized in Atkins v. 
Virginia,116 persons with intellectual disabilities have characteristics that make it 
more difficult for them to function in challenging environments: 
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage 
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills 
such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest 
before age 18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference 
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of 
their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities 
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from 
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.117 
Indeed, Madrid v. Gomez,118 the first of the significant cases articulating an 
Eighth Amendment rationale for the exclusion of the seriously mentally ill from 
isolation, noted that just as the California Department of Corrections itself 
recognized a category of prisoners (classified as “Category J” prisoners) whose 
serious mental illness required a supportive inpatient environment, the system also 
recognized a category of prisoners (“Category K”) whose cognitive impairment 
required a supportive inpatient environment.119 Nonetheless, prisoners at Pelican 
Bay could not be classified to that category by staff at that facility; such 
classifications could be ordered only at two other prisons in the system.120 The 
court, relying on expert testimony that prisoners with brain damage or intellectual 
impairment, like the seriously mentally ill, were at particularly high risk of 
deterioration if placed in the SHU,121 ordered their exclusion from such 
confinement.122 
 
115. The term “cognitive disabilities” includes limitations in intellectual and academic 
functioning as well as deficiencies in adaptive behavior. See, e.g., WIS. DEP’T OF PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION, ELIGIBILITY CHECKLIST: COGNITIVE DISABILITIES, available at http://
sped.dpi.wi.gov/files/forms/pdf/podelg-cd-001.pdf (requiring deficiencies in these three areas to 
qualify for certain services). 
116. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that offenders with “mental 
retardation” are not eligible for the death penalty). In order to avoid confusion, I have reluctantly 
used the term used by the Supreme Court rather than a term such as “cognitive disorder” or 
“intellectual disabilities.” 
117. Id. at 318. 
118. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
119. Id. at 1220 n.154. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1236. 
122. Id. at 1265–66. 
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In Indiana Protection & Advocacy Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana Department 
of Corrections,123 the court found a violation of the Eighth Amendment in the 
confinement of the seriously mentally ill to isolation units in a number of state 
prisons.124 For the purpose of its opinion, the court defined the “seriously 
mentally ill” as including prisoners with organic brain syndrome as well as “mental 
retardation . . . leading to significant functional impairment.”125 The inclusion 
within the plaintiff class of prisoners with cognitive disorders suggests an 
appropriate strategy for these cases given the relative lack of cases challenging 
isolated confinement on behalf of prisoners with intellectual disabilities compared 
to the numbers that have been brought on behalf of mentally ill prisoners. 
Grouping may promote a showing of numerosity for class certification.126 At the 
same time, the effects of failure to treat the seriously mentally ill are likely to be far 
more dramatic than the slow deterioration of prisoners with cognitive disabilities 
in the environment of an isolation unit, combining a lack of mental stimulation 
with often stressful conditions, so the context of the larger class may make it 
easier to convey the evidence of the debilitating nature of such confinement.127 
C. Challenges Related to Other Serious Medical Needs, Including Physical Disabilities  
Prisoners who have serious medical needs that do not concern their mental 
health may not be disproportionately at risk for being placed in isolated 
confinement, but they are particularly at risk in isolated confinement. Of course, 
many prisoners placed in segregation have both serious medical problems and 
serious mental health problems, and their various conditions interact to produce 
an unreasonable level of risk. For example, during a five-year period, at least four 
prisoners died in the Michigan prison system from an interaction of their mental 
illness with the conditions in their segregated housing and their resulting needs for 
medical attention.128 
One of these prisoners was Anthony McManus who was five-feet-seven 
inches tall and at the time of death weighed seventy-five pounds; he was reported 
as looking like a concentration camp prisoner.129 Nonetheless, staff restricted his 
access to food and water, and a nurse approved the use of chemical agents on 
him.130 A nurse also observed him when he was moved, naked and emaciated, to 
another cell, but did not examine him; a videotape shows him requesting water.131 
 
123. Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n, v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317, 
2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012). 
124. See id. at *23. 
125. Id. at *8. 
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 94–101. 
128. See Elizabeth Alexander & Patricia Streeter, Isolated Confinement in Michigan: Mapping the 
Circles of Hell, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 251, 253–60 (2013). 
129. See Valarie v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:07-cv-5, slip op. at 3, 6 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 
2009). 
130. Id. at 6. 
131. Id. at 7. 
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Two days later, correctional officers asked that medical staff see him.132 The next 
morning he was found dead.133 
Another mentally ill prisoner was placed in a closed-door observation room 
at a facility for the mentally ill within the Michigan Department of Corrections.134 
After that placement, a psychiatrist prescribed a psychotropic medication that 
interfered with his body’s ability to regulate heat.135 The temperature in the 
observation room reached ninety-six degrees although it was January.136 Despite 
noting that the patient’s condition was worsening in the excessive heat of the 
room, the psychiatrist ignored a nurse’s report indicating that the patient was 
dehydrated and needed immediate medical attention.137 The prisoner was vomiting 
and dry heaving, but stayed in the overheated room until he was found dead the 
following morning.138 
A third Michigan prisoner collapsed on the prison yard during a period of 
high temperatures.139 He was crying and incoherent at the time.140 A correctional 
officer, apparently assuming that his symptoms reflected mental illness, took him 
to an observation cell that was functionally a segregation cell.141 The prisoner was 
described as screaming and barking like a dog.142 The next day, the prisoner’s 
water was turned off by correctional staff, and a psychologist decided that the 
prisoner was psychotic.143 Although the psychologist asked that the water be 
turned back on, the correctional staff failed to do so.144 Later that day, the 
prisoner drank from the toilet.145 Three days after he was moved to the cell, 
mental health staff described him as “virtually non-responsive.”146 Again, the 
water was turned off, and the following day, the prisoner was found dead, in rigor 
mortis, in the cell.147 
The fourth death was that of Timothy Souders, a young prisoner with an 
untreated mental illness, who spent five days, much of the time naked and lying in 
his own urine, in two segregation cells.148 During that time, Souders was confined 
in top-of-bed restraints in a hot and humid closed cell where neither medical nor 
 
132. Id. at 8. 
133. Id. 
134. See Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 2008). 
135. Id. at 662–63. 
136. Id. at 660–61. 
137. Id. at 662–63. 
138. Id. at 661. 




143. Id. at 284. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 285. 
147. Id. 
148. See Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577–78 (W.D. Mich. 2006), remanded, 248 F. 
App’x 678 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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mental health staff responded to his obvious medical needs.149 A court reviewing 
the death described it as follows: “[A] psychotic man with apparent delusions and 
screaming incoherently was left in chains on a concrete bed over an extended 
period of time with no effective access to medical or psychiatric care and with 
custody staff telling him that he would be kept in four-point restraints until he was 
cooperative.”150 
As the above examples illustrate, mentally ill prisoners, as well as other 
prisoners with urgent and emergent medical issues, can be particularly at risk when 
housed in isolation. Although the deaths discussed above all involve prisoners 
with serious mental health issues, such prisoners are the canary in the mineshaft 
demonstrating the risks for others with serious medical problems.151 For prisoners 
with disabilities, confinement in segregation can result in placement in a 
nonaccessible cell, or custody restrictions can bar assistive devices such as canes or 
crutches.152 In other cases, a prisoner may be assigned to an isolation cell because 
the cell happens to offer some feature related to the prisoner’s medical condition, 
such as the isolation of prisoners who have potentially contagious conditions.153 
 
149. Id. at 577–80. 
150. See id. at 578 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 106B.). 
151. For instance, another Michigan prisoner, Martinique Stoudemire, returned to prison 
from a hospital after the amputation of her second leg. Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 
560, 564 (6th Cir. 2013). The day of arrival, a laboratory report arrived indicating that the wound from 
the operation was infected with Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA). See id. at 566. 
As a result, she was placed in medical isolation in the prison segregation unit. Id. The unit was not 
equipped for her disabilities and she experienced difficulties transferring from her wheelchair to the 
cell toilet, resulting in occasions in which she was unable to reach the toilet in time. Stoudemire v. 
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-15387, slip op. at 3–4 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2014). When Ms. 
Stoudemire requested assistance in dressing in the unsanitary cell in segregation, two nurses said she 
could do it herself. Women’s Huron Valley Segregation Log Book entry for Jan. 18, 2006, at 30 (Bates 
016824). The log records from the segregation unit confirm that she was refusing meals and that she 
was vomiting. See id. Log Book entries for Jan. 19, 2006; Jan. 20, 2006; Jan. 28, 2006; Jan. 30, 2006; 
Feb. 1, 2006; Feb. 2, 2006; Feb. 4, 2006. The records also confirm that she requested assistance with 
toileting and dressing, and at times that assistance was not provided. Id. Log Book entries for Jan. 18, 
2006; Jan. 24, 2006; Jan. 31, 2006. By February 4, 2006, Ms. Stoudemire was complaining of difficulty 
breathing and custody staff gave the information to the nurse. Later that day, she asked again for 
medical assistance for difficulty breathing, and was told to report her problem. A custody officer 
brought that report to the attention of a nurse, who said to tell another nurse in a few minutes. The 
log notes that two nurses saw her, and that later, custody again requested that a nurse see Ms. 
Stoudemire. Id. Log Book entry for Feb. 4, 2006. On February 5, another unidentified medical staff 
member wrote “B.S.” on a prison health care form in which a different staff member transmitted Ms. 
Stoudemire’s report that she was having difficulty breathing and feeling pain in her chest, 
experiencing diarrhea, and not eating or drinking. See Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Health Care Contact 
Worksheet, Feb. 5, 2006. Two days later, Ms. Stoudemire was transported for her regularly scheduled 
follow-up appointment at the hospital where the amputation had been performed. Because of her 
breathing and heart problems, the checkup turned into a two-week hospital stay. Stoudemire, No. 07-
15387, slip op. at 3 (citing Stoudemire Decl. ¶ 24). 
152. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1050–51. (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding 
ADA claim when prisoners challenged transfer for disciplinary, safety, or medical reasons from 
facility equipped for disabilities to nonequipped facilities). 
153. See Stoudemire, No. 07-15387, slip op. at 3 (assigning a prisoner to isolation because of her 
medical condition). 
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Prisoners in isolation generally have more limited access to medical personnel. 
Medical staff may make rounds in an isolation unit, but the primary purpose for 
such rounds is typically to deliver medication. Even if medical staff do make 
rounds in the isolation unit, the solid (or mostly solid) doors typical of isolation 
units pose a barrier to confidential communications between staff and prisoners, 
as well as an obstacle to staff observation of the condition of the prisoners. 
Similarly, outside appointments, as well as medical appointments within the 
prison, may be delayed until the prisoner is out of isolation because of the 
reluctance to transport such prisoners outside the isolation unit. Sanitation is 
frequently far worse in isolation units because staff may not allow prisoners access 
to cleaning agents or equipment to clean their cells; custody staff may frequently 
discharge chemical agents; and prisoners may set fires or deliberately flood their 
cells, so the physical conditions pose special risks to prisoners with heightened 
vulnerability to infections or impaired respiratory function. The rules of isolation 
units also typically limit access to showers and to exercise, which may have health 
implications for particular prisoners.154 
Moreover, the fact that relationships between staff and prisoners are almost 
universally more fraught with tension in the isolation units—and more stressful 
for staff as well as prisoners—also has important consequences for the delivery of 
medical and mental health care. Staff members, including medical and mental 
health staff, are particularly likely to view prisoners in isolation as manipulators 
seeking medical attention for secondary gain.155 It would be deeply surprising if 
prisoners in isolation did not frequently exaggerate symptoms when seeking 
medical attention precisely because the restricted access to medical care and the 
distressing conditions of isolation itself provide an obvious motive to do so. 
Unfortunately, as the cases from Michigan illustrate, the development of a culture 
in which medical staff view prisoners seeking access to care as manipulators closes 
off the only access to medical care that a prisoner has and can easily lead to tragic 
consequences.156 
While the category of prisoners with serious medical needs may seem more 
diverse than the other categories considered so far, it is sufficiently defined to 
qualify for class treatment. In the ground-breaking litigation regarding medical and 
 
154. These statements are based on my experience investigating, in connection with litigation, 
a large number of correctional facilities in many different jurisdictions over a number of years. The 
statements are not true of all facilities, and some are unlikely to be true of most facilities, since my 
experience is skewed by the focus of the investigations on facilities that were thought to pose 
potential Eighth Amendment violations. 
155. See Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577–78 (W.D. Mich. 2006), remanded, 248 F. 
App’x 678 (6th Cir. 2007) (refusing to examine a seriously mentally ill prisoner taken from isolation 
unit to medical unit for medical examination shortly before death because he had urinated on 
examination table); see also supra note 151 (discussing Stoudemire, No. 07-15387) (staff entry in 
prisoner’s medical record that her complaints of difficulty breathing and chest pain while confined in 
segregation because of MRSA infection were “B.S.”; shortly thereafter she needed hospitalization for 
two weeks). 
156. See Hadix, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577–78. 
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mental health care within California’s massive prison system, federal courts 
certified a class of prisoners with serious medical needs unrelated to mental health, 
as well as a class of prisoners with serious mental health needs.157 Thus, there is 
nothing conceptually novel about certifying a class of prisoners whose physical 
health would be placed at unreasonable risk by isolated confinement. To date, 
however, there appear to have been no cases in which a putative class of prisoners 
at serious risk of physical harm from confinement in isolation attempted to gain 
exclusion. Nonetheless, such a class is a conceptually straightforward application 
of Farmer v. Brennan.158 
In fact, in many if not most cases in which the plaintiffs seek to exclude a 
class of persons who are at substantial risk of serious mental or emotional harm 
when placed in isolated confinement, it seems likely that there is also a potential 
class of persons whose physical health would be substantially endangered. 
Although such a class would share a common vulnerability to serious harm in 
isolation, the source of that unreasonable risk could come from the interaction of 
medical and mental health issues, as in the Michigan death cases cited above.159 
Alternately, such an unreasonable risk could arise from the combination of a 
prisoner’s vulnerability and the cell’s design (such as a prisoner at increased risk of 
heat injury in a cell that routinely overheats in hot weather,160 or a prisoner in a 
cell without accommodations who needs an assistive device to transfer from a 
wheelchair to a toilet161); or from the nature of staff-prisoner interactions in the 
unit (such as use of chemical agents on a prisoner with serious mental illness or 
with a serious respiratory condition, such as asthma).162 Accordingly, this could be 
a fertile area for new litigation combating isolation. 
 
157. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924–26 (2011) (describing the plaintiffs in the 
consolidated case as encompassing a class of all California prisoners with serious medical conditions 
(the Plata class) as well as a separate class of all California prisoners who were seriously mentally ill 
(the Coleman class)); see also Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (also describing the 
Plata class); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (describing the Coleman 
class). 
158. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 824, 837 (1994). 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 128–151; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (violating the 
Eighth Amendment can spring from the interaction of various conditions; there need not be just one 
source of the risk); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (violating the Eighth Amendment can 
result from a combination of conditions where their effect is to create a deprivation of a specific 
human need). 
160. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 340 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming portion of trial court 
injunction designed to protect class of prisoners segregated in Death Row unit from exposure to 
excessive heat). 
161. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (allowing claim to proceed under 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in light of lower court finding that where prisoner with 
paraplegia had stated a claim under Eighth Amendment based on allegations that he was unsafe and 
had suffered injuries in segregation facility not equipped for his disabilities). 
162. See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming injunction against 
use of chemical agents on a prisoner with mental illness rendering him incapable of controlling his 
behavior in response); cf. Eccleston v. Oregon ex rel. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 168 F. App’x. 760, 761 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of injunctive relief against use of chemical agents given the lack of claim 
that the plaintiff had a respiratory condition). 
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D. Pregnant Women 
While the category of pregnant women could be simply folded into the last 
category of prisoners with challenges related to serious medical needs, there are 
two factors that justify some additional comments. First, the obvious: unlike any 
other category, confining a pregnant woman in isolation has effects not only on 
her health, but also on the health of her fetus. Second, it seems easier for judges 
and the general public to find unnecessarily harsh treatment of pregnant women 
inhumane and to view women in late pregnancy or labor as particularly unlikely to 
pose a security threat. Indeed, there is a useful model of this phenomenon of 
greater empathy for pregnant prisoners in the other highly effective campaign for 
prisoner health and safety in the last few years: the campaign to end the practice of 
shackling pregnant women. In 2000, Illinois became the first state to enact a law 
restricting the practice of shackling pregnant women; today there are twenty states 
with laws restricting shackling, and all but twelve state corrections systems, as well 
as the Federal Bureau of Prisons, have policies that in some manner restrict 
shackling during pregnancy and delivery.163 Restrictions on the use of isolation on 
pregnant women would seem likely to raise similar health and safety concerns. So 
far, however, the only example of successful litigation occurred in New York 
State. In February 2014, the New York Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision agreed to a comprehensive settlement of a legal challenge 
to isolated confinement. In the settlement, the department agreed to take 
 
163. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (amended 2012). The 
statute was revised in 2012 to ensure coverage of all correctional facilities in the state. See id. For other 
state statutes imposing restrictions on shackling during pregnancy, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-
601 (2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 17-1-113.7, 
17-26-104.7, 19-2-924.7, 26-1-137, 31-15-403 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6603 (West Supp. 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.241 (West, Westlaw through 
2014 2d Reg. Sess. & Sp. A Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 353-122 (West Supp. 2013); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. §§ 20-901–903 (West Supp. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:744.2, 744.8 (West, Westlaw 
through 2014 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 9-601 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 118 (West 2002 & Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
241.87–89 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.376 (West Supp. 
2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-4.2 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.); N.Y. CORRECT. 
LAW § 611 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2014); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1758, 5905 (West 2010); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56.3-3 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 555 of the Jan. 2014 Sess.); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 501.066 (West 2012); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 361.082 (West 2005 & Supp. 
2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 801a (West, Westlaw through 2014 Adjourned Sess.); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 72.09.65 (West 2004). The seven states that fail to restrict shackling of pregnant 
women are Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah. Personal 
communication from Amy Fettig, Staff Lawyer, Am. Civil Liberties Union Nat’l Prison Project ( July 
11, 2014) (on file with author) (providing an updated but as yet unpublished compilation of the status 
of antishackling policies in individual states). For an earlier version of the compilation, see ACLU, 
State Standards for Pregnancy-Related Health Care and Abortion for Women in Prison, ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/maps/state-standards-pregnancy-related-health-care-and-abortion-women-prison-map 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
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“immediate steps to remove . . . pregnant inmates” from “extreme isolation.”164 
This litigation could serve as a model for plaintiffs in other jurisdictions since the 
inclusion of pregnant women in this larger class avoids possible problems with 
attempting to demonstrate numerosity in a more limited class, and it adds a group 
of particularly sympathetic plaintiffs.165 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE  
SPECIAL CASE OF CONFINED YOUTH 
Challenges to isolated confinement of those under eighteen years of age 
based on the special vulnerabilities of youth take place in a more complex legal 
landscape than those seeking the exclusion of the categories discussed above. 
These cases include several different legal statuses: youth committed to a juvenile 
facility,166 youth detained awaiting a hearing on commitment to a juvenile 
facility,167 and youth who are held in an adult facility pursuant to criminal 
proceedings, whether pretrial or after conviction.168 Claims against a juvenile 
facility seeking an end to isolated confinement are frequently filed under both the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Eighth 
Amendment.169 
The courts have responded with a variety of conclusions about the 
applicable constitutional standard. Some courts have applied the Eighth 
Amendment to claims of youth who have been judicially committed to a juvenile 
facility, as well as those who have been convicted of an adult crime for which they 
are serving a sentence.170 Other courts have held that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, applies to those 
committed to juvenile facilities, since the youth have not been convicted of a 
crime.171 Still, other courts have applied the Eighth Amendment to certain claims 
 
164. See NYCLU Lawsuit Secures Historic Reforms to Solitary Confinement, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nyclu-lawsuit-secures-historic-reforms-solitary 
-confinement. 
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
166. See, e.g., H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 1986); Morales v. 
Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 1974). 
167. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wash. Cnty., 150 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998). 
168. See, e.g., Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 732 (6th Cir. 2005); Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 
F.2d 1271, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 1989) (considering claim that youth convicted of adult crime was 
subjected to a violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment when 
he was held in an adult jail where he committed suicide after being harassed by adult prisoners). 
169. See, e.g., Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 934 (10th Cir. 1982); Morales, 562 F.2d at 998 
n.1; Nelson, 491 F.2d at 353, 355, 358. 
170. See, e.g., Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010); Morales, 
562 F.2d at 998 n.1; cf. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying Eighth 
Amendment to youth incarcerated for offenses that would constitute crimes, but applying Due 
Process Clause to those found to have committed status offenses or minor offenses). 
171. See, e.g., Daniels, 396 F.3d at 735 (youth confined in adult jail); Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 
F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); Jarrard, 786 F.2d at 1085 (finding youth protected by both the Eighth 
Amendment and a Fourteenth Amendment right to treatment); Milonas, 691 F.2d at 942 & n.10; 
Nelson, 491 F.2d at 355, 358. 
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regarding conditions of confinement and the Due Process Clause to other 
conditions claims.172 
In many cases, however, it does not matter which constitutional provision is 
applied because the court concludes that the “deliberate indifference” standard, 
applicable to conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment, is also the 
proper benchmark for conditions of confinement claims brought under the Due 
Process Clause.173 The application of the same standard, however, does not dictate 
that a “deliberate indifference” standard will produce the same results when 
applied to youth as it does in cases involving adult prisoners. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the treatment of youth in 
the criminal justice system raises particular concerns because of differences in 
their state of intellectual and emotional development compared to that of typical 
adults. In Ropers v. Simmons,174 for example, the Supreme Court noted, in the 
course of striking down the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed 
when the offender was under eighteen years of age, that youth show a “lack of 
maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility.”175 Similarly, in Graham v. 
Florida,176 in which the Court struck down life sentences without the possibility of 
parole as punishment for crimes committed before the age of eighteen that did 
not involve homicide, it noted the “fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds.”177 Neurological evidence indicates that a part of the frontal lobe, the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), is among the last regions of the brain to 
complete development.178 This region of the brain is “linked to the ability to 
inhibit impulses, weigh consequences of decisions, prioritize, and strategize.”179 
Just as this lack of maturity may predispose youth to commit impulsive criminal 
acts, it could also lead youth to commit impulsive acts within the restrictive 
confinement of a correctional facility—including actions that violate the 
institution’s rules as well as incidents of self-harm. 
Another risk factor for youth confined in an adult prison or jail is that they 
 
172. In Nelson, 491 F.2d at 355, the court concluded that beatings of youth by staff violated 
the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The court found that other aspects of 
confinement at the facility violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to rehabilitative treatment, 
which includes a right to individualized treatment. Id. at 360. 
173. See, e.g., Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956, 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2012) (involving treatment 
of youth at detention facility filed under the Fourteenth Amendment; court applied the Eighth 
Amendment deliberate indifference standard, noting that “the standards under the Fourteenth and 
Eighth Amendments do not differ for our purposes”); A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile 
Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying substantive due process “shocks the conscious” 
test to detained youth; under that test, “deliberate indifference” to youth’s safety would satisfy 
standard). 
174. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
175. Id. at 569–70. 
176. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
177. Id. at 68. 
178. See Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. 
SCI. 77, 83 (2004). 
179. Id. 
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are often assigned to isolation for protection.180 This practice is based on the 
statistically accurate perception of staff that youth are at higher risk of physical 
and sexual assault because of their small size or assumed lack of sophistication.181 
Certainly, the conditions in juvenile isolation can result in risks that rival or exceed 
those of conditions that have occasioned findings of constitutional violations in 
adult facilities, as shown by this description by the United States Department of 
Justice of the isolation unit in a Mississippi juvenile facility: 
  Girls in the [isolation unit] are punished for acting out or for being 
suicidal by being placed in a cell called the “dark room.” The “dark 
room” is a locked, windowless isolation cell with lighting controlled by 
staff. When the lights are turned out, as the girls reported they are when 
the room is in use, the room is completely dark. The room is stripped of 
everything but a drain in the floor which serves as a toilet. 
  Most girls are stripped naked when placed in the “dark room.” 
According to Columbia staff, the reason girls must remove their clothing 
before being placed in the darkroom, [sic] is that there is metal grating on 
the ceiling and the cell door which could be used for hanging attempts by 
suicidal girls. Such suicidal hazards should be remedied rather than 
requiring suicidal children to strip naked.182 
When the unique psychological and cognitive issues affecting youth are 
considered, including the factors suggesting that youth are more impulsive and 
therefore less likely to fully consider the long-range impact from their actions, the 
data suggest that conditions like these, which are considered too extreme for an 
adult to tolerate for a short period, are likely to be experienced as even more 
 
180. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, GROWING UP LOCKED 
DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND PRISONS ACROSS THE UNITED 
STATES 19 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1012ForUpload.pdf 
(noting studies indicating that youth held in adult facilities are three times more likely to be sexually 
assaulted, twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and fifty percent more likely to be attacked with a 
weapon than youth held in juvenile facilities). 
181. Id.; see also Edward Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: Effects of 
a Broad Policy in One Court, JUV. JUST. BULL., Dec. 2012, at 4, available at http://www.ojjdp.gov 
/pubs/232932.pdf (“The available evidence points to the conclusion that adolescents are at increased 
risk of being physically or sexually victimized when they are housed in adult facilities.”). But see 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 242114, PREA DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, 
2013, at 2 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca13.pdf (noting that the rate 
of sexual assault that youth in adult facilities reported was higher than the rate of such assaults 
reported by adult prisoners, but the difference was not statistically significant). 
182. Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Ronnie Musgrove, Governor of 
Miss. 7 ( June 19, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/oak_colu
_miss_findinglet.pdf. For cases considering comparable conditions in the context of isolation in adult 
prisons, see Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1257–58 (9th Cir. 1982), which found a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment when isolation cells allowed little or no light into the cell, and lights were 
controlled by correctional officers, abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
See also Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1981) (confining youth in isolation without 
adequate clothing supports an Eighth Amendment claim; clothing is a basic necessity of human 
existence); McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1975) (violating the Eighth Amendment 
when isolation cells were “essentially concrete boxes” in which a hole in the floor served as the toilet). 
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intolerable by an adolescent.183 For that reason, it is not surprising that more than 
sixty percent of all suicides of adolescents in correctional facilities involve youth 
who have spent time in isolated confinement, and half of all youth suicides in such 
facilities occur in isolation.184 
Youth held in isolation (often called “room confinement” in juvenile 
facilities) thus constitute another group in which it should be possible to show the 
existence of an excessive risk of harm, satisfying the objective component of the 
deliberate indifference standard that applies to adult prisoners.185 Indeed, there is a 
body of case law holding that confinement of youth in isolation violates the 
Constitution.186 Recent developments also highlight the vulnerability to legal 
challenge of jurisdictions permitting the isolation of youth. In the recent 
settlement agreement in New York, state officials promised that youth in 
disciplinary confinement in the adult prison system would be given at least five 
hours of outdoor exercise and programming outside of their cells five days a week, 
and certain facilities would maintain separate housing for youth who would 
ordinarily be placed in solitary confinement.187 The state also agreed to set aside 
space at designated facilities to accommodate the youth who would normally be 
placed in solitary confinement.188 
Shortly after the New York settlement, the U.S. Department of Justice 
 
183. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1257–58; Maxwell, 668 F.2d at 365; McCray, 509 F.2d at 1336. 
184. LINDSAY M. HAYES, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE SUICIDE IN CONFINEMENT: A NATIONAL SURVEY 18, 
26 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/213691.pdf. 
185. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To the extent that such isolation takes 
place pursuant to an institutional policy or routine practice, it would also be likely to violate the 
subjective component of deliberate indifference, because many objectionable conditions of isolation, 
such as the lack of necessary lighting, ventilation, clothing, or toileting facilities would be obvious to 
staff. See id. at 842 (allowing inference that when the challenged conditions would have been 
“obvious” to a defendant, that they were known to the defendant, although the inference is not 
required); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 934 (10th Cir. 1982); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 
998 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 353, 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1974). 
186. See, e.g., R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1155–56 (D. Haw. 2006) (finding that a 
policy of placing youth in long-term isolation violated the Constitution); D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F. 
Supp. 896, 905 (D. Or. 1982) (finding a constitutional violation in placing younger children in 
isolation cells to protect them from older youth); Inmates of Boys’ Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. 
Supp. 1354, 1366–67 (D.R.I. 1972) (holding that isolation of youth under conditions at facility 
violated the Eighth Amendment); Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 480 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that solitary confinement of a fourteen-year-old girl for two weeks in strip 
cell with only night clothes and no recreational facilities or reading matter violated the Eighth 
Amendment); cf. Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 35 (D.P.R. 1979) (holding solitary confinement 
of young adults unconstitutional); Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 209 (S.D.N.Y 
1976) (requiring a state to follow its own policies that limited isolation of youth to twenty-four hours; 
that policy represented minimum constitutional requirements). 
187. See Benjamin Weiser, New York State in Deal to Limit Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
20, 2014, at A1; NYCLU Lawsuit Secures Historic Reforms to Solitary Confinement, supra note 164. 
188. NYCLU Lawsuit Secures Historic Reforms to Solitary Confinement, supra note 164. According to 
the announcement of the New York Civil Liberties Union, which provided counsel to the plaintiffs in 
the litigation, the prison system would also take “immediate steps to remove youth, pregnant inmates 
and intellectually challenged prisoners from extreme isolation.” See id. 
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expanded litigation challenging solitary confinement to all Ohio juvenile 
correctional facilities.189 Two months later, it announced a settlement that would 
reduce and eventually eliminate solitary confinement throughout Ohio.190 
Significantly, that settlement was supported by a concession from Ohio that the 
relief approved in the settlement was enforceable as a court order because it was 
necessary to remedy a constitutional violation.191 
Litigation challenges to the use of isolation on youth, and state and local 
advocacy campaigns seeking to eliminate isolated confinement extending longer 
than necessary to defuse a crisis, seem to present a real target of opportunity, 
particularly because there are so many horror tales about youth sent to solitary.192 
Moreover, there should be far fewer debates during monitoring about class 
membership. In contrast to questions of serious mental illness, for example, 
whether someone is below the age of eighteen is ordinarily not subject to debate. 
V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
As noted above, in Wilkinson v. Austin,193 the Supreme Court ruled that the 
prisoners subjected to indefinite confinement in Ohio’s supermax, the Ohio State 
Prison, have a right to procedural due process.194 The Court held that the 
“extreme isolation” flowing from conditions at the supermax, in light of the 
indefinite length of confinement and the lack of eligibility for parole while 
prisoners were confined there, constituted an “atypical and significant” 
deprivation.195 Thus, confinement under such conditions satisfied the standard 
that the Court had announced in its earlier case of Sandin v. Connor196 for 
recognizing a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.197 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s cautious endorsement of an “isolation 
plus” standard for the imposition of due process protections, the lower federal 
courts since Wilkinson have been somewhat more open to finding that prisoners 
 
189. Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Settles Lawsuit Against State of 
Ohio to End Unlawful Seclusion of Youth in Juvenile Correctional Facilities, JUST. NEWS (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/may/14-crt-541.html. 
190. Id.; see also Agreed Order at 1–2, S.H. v. Reed, 2:04-cv-1206 (S.D. Ohio May 21,  
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ohiojuv_order_5-21-14.pdf 
(consolidating the Department of Justice case with a private lawsuit for the purpose of case 
management and approving the settlement among all parties). 
191. See Agreed Order, supra note 190, at 3 (including the findings necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012)). 
192. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 182 (describing the conditions of girls sent to 
isolation in Mississippi). In addition, such cases in a separate juvenile facility would by their nature 
involve an abolitionist strategy, because the class would include all the persons confined in the facility. 
193. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005). 
194. Id. at 224. 
195. Id. at 214. 
196. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 476 (1995). 
197. Id. at 486–87 (holding that isolated confinement of a prisoner is not protected by 
procedural due process unless it represents an “atypical, significant deprivation” or it necessarily 
affects the length of a prisoner’s sentence). 
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have a protected liberty interest in avoiding isolated confinement. The most that 
one can say, however, is that conditions similar to the supermax conditions in the 
Ohio State Prison, imposed for a period of at least one year, have a good chance 
of being found subject to due process protections.198 Of course, prisoners 
considering such litigation might ask how much a successful lawsuit would actually 
improve their circumstances, as observance of procedural regularity hardly ensures 
that the result of the process will actually be fair and equitable. This is particularly 
so in light of the minimal nature of the procedural protections that the Supreme 
Court has mandated for decisions that can have serious consequences for 
prisoners threatened with solitary confinement. 
In Wilkinson, despite the extreme consequences of prisoners being assigned 
to a supermax that imposed extreme isolation and barred the possibility of parole, 
the Supreme Court imposed only the weakest of protections.199 The Court 
determined that the procedures the prison system claimed to be following were 
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process, since all that was needed were 
“informal, nonadversary procedures,” modeled after the procedures the Court had 
previously approved for parole hearings.200 According to the Court, the policy that 
 
198. The lower courts have not converged upon criteria, including the length of time in 
isolation, for qualifying as atypical and significant under Sandin and Wilkinson. See, e.g., Toevs v. Reid, 
685 F.3d 903, 910–11, 914 (10th Cir. 2012) (recognizing a due process right to meaningful review in 
light of the prisoner’s confinement for seven years in conditions similar to those in Wilkinson); Marion 
v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697–99 (7th Cir. 2009) (reversing order of dismissal and 
remanding; if conditions in segregation were found to be sufficiently severe, the court could find that 
punishment of 240 days of disciplinary segregation required due process); Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 
F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2008) (reversing dismissal of complaint that alleged that plaintiff had been 
confined in administrative segregation for three years and that his confinement was indefinite in 
length). Some of the circuits had reached similar conclusions simply on the basis of Sandin. See, e.g., 
Heron v. Schriro, 11 F. App’x 659, 661 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that confinement in administrative 
segregation for thirteen years constituted an atypical and significant deprivation); Colon v. Howard, 
215 F.3d 227, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding a protected liberty interest when prisoner was confined 
“in normal SHU conditions” for 305 days); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (locking 
a prisoner in isolation for eight years, where all but two hours per week were spent in his cell while 
barred from programming, implicated a liberty interest under Sandin); Hatch v. District of Columbia, 
184 F.3d 846, 847, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (remanding for district court to compare conditions imposed 
on plaintiff to the most restrictive conditions imposed on prisoners at any facility to which prisoners 
in the system are routinely transferred; court should also consider the length of such plaintiff’s 
restrictive confinement to determine if the plaintiff had sustained an atypical and significant 
deprivation); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088–89, 1095 (9th Cir. 1996) (remanding to district 
court to reconsider whether conditions in segregation created an atypical and significant deprivation; 
conditions that did not violate the Eighth Amendment could nonetheless constitute such a 
deprivation); Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (assuming that because the 
plaintiff was confined to administrative segregation for a year, a penalty much more severe than that 
involved in Sandin, he suffered an atypical and significant deprivation requiring due process). 
199. This follows a dispiriting pattern. For example, even for prison disciplinary hearings in 
which the punishment could involve the loss of good time, and thus can result in a substantial 
increase in the length of sentence, the Court has held that a finding of guilt need not be based on a 
preponderance of the evidence. See Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (holding that 
requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision of prison disciplinary 
board to revoke good time credits). 
200. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229 (2005) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. 
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applied to the supermax provided notice of the factual basis for considering 
supermax assignment by providing a short summary of the reasons for 
reclassification decisions and “a fair opportunity for rebuttal,” consisting of the 
right of the prisoner to submit information at the initial stage of placement 
decisions, as well as an opportunity to submit objections before the final level of 
review.201 
These procedures appeared particularly inadequate to provide procedural 
protection in Wilkinson itself. The Ohio prison system, with the opening of the 
supermax, had much more bed capacity at the most restrictive level than its own 
staff thought it needed, but was short of beds at the second-highest security level, 
creating pressure to classify prisoners to the supermax.202 Given the minimal 
nature of the due process protections mandated by the Supreme Court, 
classifications to supermax based on considerations other than the security threat 
posed by a particular prisoner seem inevitable. In practice, the Ohio prison 
classification hearings had often seemed arbitrary and capricious.203 This follows a 
familiar pattern, since prison disciplinary hearings that can involve a loss of good 
time, and accordingly a longer period of prison confinement, often make a 
mockery of any concept of basic fairness.204 
 
Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)). Greenholtz held that, for parole hearings that 
implicated a state-created due process interest, the procedures must include an opportunity to be 
heard by the decision makers, although that opportunity need not necessarily occur at the hearing 
itself. The procedures must also include notice of the reason for the decision, but the notice need not 
include a summary of the evidence relied upon. Id. 
201. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225–26. Following remand, the prison officials admitted that they 
were not following the classification policy upon which the Supreme Court had relied, and the district 
court had to issue another order requiring implementation of that policy. See Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 
F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (noting that prison officials did not contest the plaintiffs’ 
claim that the prison system was not following the “New Policy” on which the Supreme Court 
decision was based). 
202. See Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723–24 (N.D. Ohio 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
203. For example, a prisoner was transferred to the supermax as a result of being charged 
with stabbing another prisoner. He was acquitted on the criminal charge stemming from the stabbing 
on the basis of his assertion of self-defense. Under Ohio law, he had the burden of persuasion on that 
defense. Nonetheless he was not reclassified, despite the fact that he had already served a sentence 
longer than the norm under the parole guidelines, so that he was in essence serving a sentence based 
on the crime of which he had been acquitted. See Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 730–31; id. at 728–36 
(offering other examples of apparently arbitrary classification decisions). 
204. Prison disciplinary hearings that qualify for due process protections are mandated to 
provide more procedural protections than the Supreme Court required in Wilkinson. See Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–66 (1974) (finding that when good time credits are subject to 
forfeiture in a prison disciplinary hearing, due process requires that a prisoner be given notice of the 
claimed violation before the hearing as well as a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the 
reasons for the disciplinary action; there is also a qualified right to call witnesses if not unduly 
hazardous to security or other correctional goals). As an example of how some prison disciplinary 
systems operate on an expectation that prisoners will be routinely and automatically be found guilty as 
charged in disciplinary hearings, see Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2000), 
describing evidence that a hearing officer assigned to disciplinary proceedings was punished because 
he had a higher-than-average rate of finding prisoners not guilty and that the Department of 
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The various opinions in the course of Wilkinson illustrate concerns about the 
unpredictability of payoffs from efforts to provide procedural due process 
remedies in the context of prisons. Although the district court ultimately forced 
the Ohio prison authorities to admit that they planned to keep some members of 
the class in supermax confinement indefinitely and found that the authorities were 
in violation of an order requiring the authorities to inform each prisoner of the 
steps necessary to promote eventual release, this ruling hardly guaranteed that 
authorities would ultimately reclassify these prisoners to lower security.205 
Nonetheless, what actually happened in Wilkinson is heartening; the plaintiffs’ 
counsel reported that after the Ohio system was required to develop a far better 
classification system,206 about eighty percent of the prisoners who had been sent 
to the supermax achieved reclassification over the course of the ordered 
hearings.207 The apparent reason for this unexpected result was that, over the 
course of the litigation, the defendants came to share, to a significant extent, the 
view that a number of prisoners were being unnecessarily assigned to the 
supermax.208 Thus, the impressive success of the Wilkinson litigation obviously 
does not guarantee that similar success will occur in other cases pursuing a 
procedural due process claim. 
There is, however, at least one discrete area where procedural due process 
claims could potentially have a significant effect in reducing the use of isolated 
confinement. In many states that retain capital punishment, prisoners under 
sentence of death are assigned to a segregated death row unit by statute or 
department of corrections policy, and the conditions on such units often 
 
Corrections coerced additional hearing officers to find prisoners guilty of disciplinary offenses. In one 
of my cases recently, as I accompanied an expert on a prison inspection, I watched and listened as a 
staff member commented to another that he did not intend to serve a notice (presumably of a 
disciplinary violation or a similar matter) on a prisoner on the second tier. This comment appeared to 
support frequent complaints by prisoners at the facility that at times staff falsely state that a prisoner 
refused to sign forms that the prisoner had never been offered, such as a notice of a disciplinary 
hearing. 
205. See Austin, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 674 (refusing to issue order requiring a reduction in 
classification of prisoners in the supermax on the ground that such an order would come 
“dangerously close to imposing substantive modifications” of the standards for release from 
supermax confinement, which the district court considered precluded by previous guidance from the 
court of appeals). 
206. See Kupers et al., supra note 105, at 1041 (noting that part of the classification system 
adopted in Mississippi that resulted in a seventy-five percent reduction in prisoners in segregation was 
based on the Ohio system’s criteria for release from isolation). The reforms in Ohio and Mississippi 
were not entirely separate developments. Ohio’s “New Policy” was officially adopted before the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Wilkinson, which was released on July 8, 2004. See Austin v. Wilkinson, 
372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). Thus, the New Policy 
would have been the official classification system of the Ohio Department of Corrections in effect at 
the time that the Mississippi reforms were implemented in 2005 to 2008. See Kupers et al., supra note 
105, at 1038–39 (the litigation that led to the Mississippi reforms was filed in 2005, and the settlement 
signed in 2007). The new Mississippi classification system was based on the Ohio New Policy. Id. at 
1038. 
207. Conversation with Jules Lobel, counsel for plaintiffs in Wilkinson (Sept. 18, 2014). 
208. Id. 
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approximate the restrictions in an isolation unit. In a recent case brought by an 
individual prisoner without certification as a class action, a district court struck 
down a practice that automatically assigned prisoners sentenced to death to 
segregated confinement.209 The court found that confinement on death row was 
more restrictive than confinement in general population at the maximum security 
facility where the death row was located, and that the conditions on death row 
“amount to a form of solitary confinement,” with prisoners spending twenty-three 
hours a day in a small cell.210 The court also pointed out that confinement on 
death row meant that the prisoner spent almost all of his time without contact 
with any other human beings, except for staff at the prison.211 Finding the 
conditions of death row “uniquely severe” in comparison to conditions in the 
maximum security facility, the court determined that death row prisoners had a 
liberty interest in avoiding this classification, and that confining all prisoners under 
sentence of death to these conditions furthered few, if any, penological goals.212 
The court concluded that the prison officials could cure the violation by providing 
the plaintiff with an individualized classification decision, or by changing the 
conditions on death row.213 This case, originally filed without counsel, suggests a 
possible model for class actions seeking similar relief in other jurisdictions that 
automatically isolate prisoners under sentence of death. 
VI. CLAIMS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Barriers to Use of the ADA 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)214 provides another 
potential source of legal claims with which to challenge solitary confinement on 
behalf of the seriously mentally ill, albeit one quite limited in potential scope.215 
Title II prohibits state and local governmental entities from excluding from 
programs or otherwise discriminating against persons with a disability if the 
person’s disability qualifies under the Act’s definition and if the person can meet 
the “essential qualifications” of the program, with or without the need of 
 
209. See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-cv-01199 (LMB/IDD), 2013 WL 6019215, at *27 (E.D. 
Va. Nov. 12, 2013). 
210. Id. at *1–2. 
211. Id. at *3. 
212. Id. at *15, *19–20. 
213. Id. at *27. 
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2012). 
215. Prisoner cases involving both ADA and Eighth Amendment claims are often dismissed 
without serious attention to doctrine. See, e.g., Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812, 813–14 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the claims of a violation of the Eighth Amendment and the ADA by a prisoner with 
paraplegia were rightfully dismissed on the ground that prisons were not subject to suit under the 
ADA and that the allegations of prisoner’s complaint that his cell doors were too narrow to allow 
passage of his wheelchair, resulting in its denial, as well as denial of access to physical therapy, 
exercise, hygiene care, and medical care, were insufficient to raise a claim under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
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reasonable accommodations.216 The Act also gives the Department of Justice the 
responsibility to promulgate regulations to implement provisions of the Act, and it 
creates a private right of action so that enforcement is not solely dependent on the 
government.217 Persons with either a physical or mental disability qualify for 
protection under the Act when that impairment substantially limits a “major life 
activity.”218 Notably, the nonexclusive list of examples of “major life activities” 
provided in the Act includes thinking and other functions of the brain.219 
Aside from the general hostility with which some federal courts approach all 
prisoner cases and the general difficulties attending success on a Title II claim, 
there are several critical barriers that prisoners face when attempting to raise an 
ADA claim based on their assignment to solitary. One is that, beyond a holding 
that there is no state sovereign immunity for cases in which the conduct at issue 
also violates the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has not resolved whether 
Congress validly waived the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title II 
cases generally, so that the availability of damages actions under Title II may be 
quite limited.220 As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that most litigants seeking 
damages would undertake the burden of creating the record necessary to show a 
valid abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment for those Title II claims unrelated to 
an Eighth Amendment claim. Most of the potential cases in which the plaintiffs 
have the resources necessary to raise a claim of abrogation are ones in which they 
are represented by the government or a nonprofit organization that seeks to 
promote disability rights, and often such organizations primarily represent 
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief.221 
 
216. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132. 
217. Id. §§ 12133–12134. 
218. Id. § 12102(1)(A). Under this section, a person also qualifies as having a disability by 
virtue of a record of such an impairment, or by being regarded as having such an impairment. Id. 
§ 12102(1)(B)–(C). 
219. Id. § 12102(2)(A)–(B). 
220. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). There have been relatively few 
subsequent cases in which a court addressed abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title II 
ADA cases, and they have reached differing results. See, e.g., Nasious v. Colorado, 495 F. App’x 899, 
903 (10th Cir. 2012) (involving an unrepresented prisoner, stating without explanation that the 
conduct challenged in the case would not, if proven, allow an abrogation of immunity because it did 
not involve a constitutional violation); Keitt v. New York City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 454–55 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying precedent from a Second Circuit nonprison case to uphold abrogation in 
prisoner’s challenge to failure to accommodate disabilities in educational programs); Muhammad v. 
Dep’t of Corr., 645 F. Supp. 2d 299, 318–19 (D.N.J. 2008) (finding prisoner’s evidence sufficient to 
deny summary judgment on Eighth Amendment claim, and therefore allowing Title II claim to 
proceed), aff’d, 396 F. App’x 789 (3d Cir. 2010); Chase v. Baskerville, 508 F. Supp. 2d 492, 506 (E.D. 
Va. 2007) (rejecting argument that Title II abrogated immunity in the absence of an Eighth 
Amendment violation), judgment aff’d, 305 F. App’x 135 (4th Cir. 2008). 
221. For example, the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation unsuccessfully represented plaintiffs in Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 
1999), seeking to halt Alabama’s policies of segregating prisoners with HIV and excluding them from 
a variety of programs. Despite the loss in Onishea, the National Prison Project later represented a new 
class of plaintiffs in Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1317 (M.D. Ala. 2012), holding that 
Alabama’s policy of excluding prisoners with HIV infection from programs violated Title II of the 
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A second barrier to the use of the ADA in challenging conditions of 
confinement of persons with disabilities is the deference that courts give to 
correctional officials’ claims that failures to accommodate prisoners with 
disabilities in isolation can be justified by security and related concerns. This 
hesitation was initially manifested in decisions refusing to find the ADA applicable 
to prisons,222 as well as decisions setting up additional burdens for prisoner 
plaintiffs seeking to prevail on such claims.223 While security issues may in some 
cases pose an obstacle to equal treatment for some prisoners with disabilities, the 
appropriate analysis should not be the refusal to apply the ADA or a standard that 
adds additional criteria to the stated ADA eligibility requirements. The analysis of 
security issues should instead be resolved by determining whether the prisoner is 
qualified for the program at issue, or can become qualified through reasonable 
accommodations. This is the analysis used by the Supreme Court in School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline,224 in which a teacher who had experienced several episodes 
of active tuberculosis brought a challenge under the employment provisions of the 
Rehabilitation Act. The Court held that the teacher was “handicapped” under the 
Act and remanded for the lower courts to determine whether she was “otherwise 
qualified,” with or without accommodations, for the position.225 Under the 
standard adopted by the Court, based on a policy of the American Medical 
Association, in order to determine whether a person with an infection posed such 
a significant risk to others that employers were justified in taking adverse 
employment actions on that basis, the decision maker should consider the nature 
of the risk (in the case of an infectious disease, how the disease is transmitted); the 
duration of the risk (of transmission); the severity of the potential harm to third 
parties; and the probability of transmission of the disease, along with the potential 
 
ADA, with the exception of the exclusion from work release. The district court held that advances in 
medical care for HIV had so changed the outlook for persons infected with HIV that Onishea no 
longer barred relief based on res judicata, and that the same evidence also demonstrated that the 
plaintiffs could be accommodated in programs without creating a significant risk to other prisoners. 
See id. at 1294, 1317. In a subsequent opinion, No. 2:11cv224–MHT, 2013 WL 5493197, at *2 (M.D. 
Ala. Sept. 30, 2013), the Henderson court approved a settlement in which the Department of 
Corrections agreed to stop excluding prisoners with HIV from all programs, including work release, 
and to change its policy of isolating incoming prisoners who tested positive for HIV infection. 
222. See Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1346 (4th Cir. 1995) (characterizing the ADA as 
having “serious implications for the management of state prisons . . . [including] security procedures” 
in case in which defendants had not challenged the applicability of the ADA to prisons; expressing 
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established,” so that defendants enjoyed qualified immunity to the imposition of damages for its 
violation). Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the ADA does apply to prisons. See Pa. Dep’t 
of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998). 
223. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446–47 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that in order to 
succeed on an ADA claim as applied to a prison, the record must demonstrate, in addition to 
satisfaction of the statutory requirements, that the exclusion was not reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological goal). 
224. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288–89 (1987). 
225. Id. at 288. 
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harm resulting from transmission.226 This standard is appropriate for judging 
security issues in ADA cases involving prisoners because it stays within the 
framework of the statute and avoids double counting the risk factor by 
considering it under the statute and yet again under judicially added glosses of the 
statute.227 
Finally, another doctrine that has been sporadically applied by several of the 
appellate federal courts is particularly likely to pose difficulties for prisoners. 
Disputes between prisoners and staff regarding medical treatment are 
commonplace because the prison is almost always the only source of medical care 
available to the prisoner. In many cases, challenges under the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,228 which is similarly intended to safeguard the 
treatment of persons with disabilities, have been rejected on the ground that the 
prisoner was really seeking to litigate a lack of necessary medical or mental health 
treatment, and that such claims are not within the purview of these statutes. The 
courts have been particularly hostile to claims that a prisoner with a disability can 
show a violation of the ADA based on a failure to provide a particular treatment 
regimen for that disability.229 In Bryant v. Madigan,230 for example, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the Rehabilitation Act “would not be violated by a prison’s 
simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners.”231 If 
refusing to treat a certain disability violates the Act on its face, it is unclear what 
principle of statutory construction allows the Act to be construed more narrowly 
because another statute or constitutional provision is violated. The Second Circuit 
has provided a slightly more reasoned argument for excluding such claims, 
suggesting that “[w]here the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) 
to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular 
decision was ‘discriminatory.’”232 The fact that it may be difficult to determine if a 
particular statutory qualification is met is hardly a reason to read a particular 
provision out of a statute. 
Another similar rationale was relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit in Schiavo 
ex rel. Shindler v. Schiavo.233 The Schiavo court reasoned that when a medical decision 
is made to deny treatment to a person with a disability, that person cannot show 
 
226. See id. 
227. See Blagdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (noting that the ADA codifies the 
holding of Arline regarding the evaluation of whether a person with a disability constitutes “a direct 
threat to the health or safety of other individuals”). 
228. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). 
229. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(endorsing the view that the ADA does “not provide a private right of action for substandard medical 
care” and expressing skepticism that an ADA claim could succeed when the disability was related to 
the medical care that the plaintiff challenged as discriminatory). 
230. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). 
231. Id. at 249. 
232. United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d 
Cir. 1984). 
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that he or she is “otherwise qualified” for the governmental benefit or program.234 
The court assumed that absent the disability the plaintiff would not need the 
medical treatment that constitutes the governmental program or benefit that has 
been denied.235 It is incorrect to assume that when the accommodation the 
plaintiff seeks involves a form of medical care, the potential accommodation will 
invariably be indistinguishable from the program eligibility sought, particularly in 
the context of prisoners. Accepting this assumption would create an arbitrary rule 
with no basis in the statutory language. 
Consider a hypothetical situation in which a correctional system, as a cost-
saving measure, had a policy of refusing to provide prisoners with prosthetic legs. 
If the prosthetic legs were provided, the prisoner would be eligible for a wide 
variety of programs that are not otherwise accessible because the programs are not 
accessible to a person in a wheelchair. Under these circumstances, construing 
provision of a prosthetic as a potential accommodation—given that prosthetics 
are routine medical care for persons with a disability and the prisoner is otherwise 
prevented from obtaining the prosthesis from the prison—is consistent with the 
ordinary ADA standards of whether an accommodation is required, creates no 
tension with the language of the Act, and serves the purpose of Title II to ensure 
equal access to government benefits for persons with disabilities. 
B. ADA Challenges to Isolation of the Mentally Ill 
One recent example in which a prisoner successfully stated a claim under the 
ADA for a program exclusion that was directly related to his disability is 
Sardakowski v. Clements.236 In that case, a prisoner raised Eighth Amendment claims 
that the prison staff was deliberately indifferent to the need for treatment of his 
serious mental illness. As a result, the plaintiff alleged he was subjected to an 
extended stay in administrative segregation that exacerbated his illness, leading to 
self-injury and suicide attempts.237 He also alleged that he qualified as disabled 
under the ADA, that his disabilities prevented him from using the “leveling-out 
program” that was designed to allow prisoners to work their way out of 
segregation, and that his inability to complete the leveling-out program resulted 
from the failure of the defendants to provide him with appropriate treatment and 
accommodations for his disabilities.238 The magistrate judge recommended that 
both the Eighth Amendment and ADA claim be allowed to go forward.239 
The U.S. Department of Justice has endorsed a similar theory of the ADA 
pursuant to its authority under the Civil Rights of Incarcerated People Act.240 In a 
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“Findings Letter” regarding an investigation of conditions of confinement at the 
State Correctional Institution-Cresson (SCI-Cresson) in Pennsylvania, the 
Department of Justice charged that the prison was violating Title II of the ADA 
by excluding prisoners with mental illness and intellectual disabilities from 
institutional programs, including classification, security, housing, and mental 
health services: 
Prisoners with disabilities thus cannot be automatically placed in 
restrictive housing for mere convenience. If prisoners with serious mental 
illness can be housed in general population by being provided adequate 
care, the prison may not house such prisoners in segregated housing 
without showing that it is necessary to make an exception.241 
The letter notes that more than sixty percent of those placed in segregation 
are mentally ill, although the mentally ill comprise only twenty-eight percent of the 
prison population.242 In addition, almost half of the prisoners who had been 
identified as having intellectual disabilities spent at least three months in 
segregation.243 In fact, SCI-Cresson operated an entire unit, called the Secure 
Special Needs Unit, in which all the prisoners had a serious mental illness.244 The 
Secure Special Needs Unit operated as an isolation unit where most of the 
prisoners were confined for twenty-two or twenty-three hours a day.245 Living 
conditions in this unit were even more austere than in the regular isolation unit.246 
For example, while the cells in the regular isolation unit had small windows that 
offered the possibility of natural light, the cells in the unit for prisoners with 
special needs were windowless.247 Prisoners assigned to this unit typically received 
less than two hours a week of structured therapy.248 A second unit, the Psychiatric 
Observation Cells, also operated as an isolation unit for prisoners who were 
considered to be dangerous to themselves.249 Prisoners assigned to the Psychiatric 
Observation Cells received minimal treatment beyond a psychiatric assessment in 
the first seventy-two hours in the unit and monitoring by nurses and correctional 
 
241. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa. 
(May 31, 2013) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i)–(ii) (2014)), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt 
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officers.250 The Findings Letter gave examples of prisoners who were punished 
because of behavior resulting from mental illness.251 The Findings Letter also 
argued that the ADA required that the facility include mental health staff in the 
process by which prisoners were classified to segregation,252 and that the facility 
was obliged to provide appropriate treatment for the disabilities of prisoners with 
serious mental illness or intellectual disabilities who remained in segregated 
confinement.253 
In February 2014, the Department of Justice sent a second Findings Letter, 
this time charging that the entire Pennsylvania Department of Corrections system 
was violating the Eighth Amendment and the ADA in its policies and practices 
related to isolation and the classification and treatment of prisoners who are 
seriously mentally ill or have intellectual disabilities.254 The allegations and the legal 
analysis in the 2014 letter regarding the ADA claim are broadly similar to the 
earlier SCI-Cresson letter.255 The second Findings Letter notes that since the initial 
letter about SCI-Cresson, the system has taken some positive steps by reducing 
the number of prisoners who have one of these disabilities and are nonetheless 
assigned to isolated confinement.256 This letter also notes that a policy is being 
developed to include mental health staff in making assessments when prisoners 
with a psychiatric or cognitive disability are subject to disciplinary hearings that 
could lead to isolated confinement, but the draft policy is not being consistently 
applied throughout the system.257 
Because of the resources and institutional prestige of the Department of 
Justice, if the Department pursues the potential litigation outlined in the Findings 
Letters, that litigation could produce a potential breakthrough in the use of the 
ADA to protect prisoners from solitary confinement. While litigation based on the 
ADA will never provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of solitary 
confinement, if for no reason other than that large numbers of prisoners assigned 
to solitary are not disabled, it may nonetheless prove a useful addition to the array 
of litigation options where a comprehensive attack on isolated confinement is not 
yet feasible. 
VII.  AN END TO TORTURE 
When I have been inside an isolation unit, either to conduct legal interviews 
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or to accompany an expert, I have experienced disturbing events ranging from 
walking across a tier in which I could not avoid stepping on human waste so that, 
after leaving the unit, I threw out my shoes, to coming across a cell where the 
walls and the floor were covered with blood because a prisoner had, several days 
earlier, deliberately cut himself. The decibel level from prisoners screaming and 
metal doors and gates clanging and often the smell make concentration difficult. I 
find it difficult to endure even a few hours in a bad unit. I find it even harder to 
imagine what it must be like for staff to spend a daily shift on such a unit, and they 
are victims too.258 The stress on someone who must live twenty-four hours a day 
in such a place is beyond my comprehension. 
Isolation causes pain and suffering to everyone subjected to it, and places 
everyone at increased risk of physical and psychological deterioration. Indeed, this 
year the National Academy of Sciences published an extensive study of 
incarceration in the United States in which it decried the restrictions on social 
contact for prisoners in isolated confinement.259 The study described supermax 
prisons as a modern version of prison isolation “that had not been widely used in 
the United States for the better part of a century,” and that had been condemned 
by many penologists and correctional legal scholars as “draconian,” “redolent with 
custodial overkill,” and a kind of confinement that “raised the level of punishment 
close to that of psychological torture.”260 
Why then has it been so difficult to persuade courts to enjoin practices that 
approach or cross the line into torture? The most obvious reason is that courts are 
deeply reluctant to interfere with practices of correctional officials, particularly 
practices that are common throughout the country and involve managing large 
numbers of prisoners. Whether this reluctance stems from a belief on the part of 
judges that prison officials actually have some special expertise to which courts 
should defer, or from a belief that however badly the current system deals with 
prisoners, disruption is likely to result in dangerous unrest, the result is to allow 
isolation to continue for many of those subjected to it.261 
There is no basis in the Supreme Court’s case law on Eighth Amendment 
conditions of confinement for this reluctance. As noted above, in Whitley v. Albers, 
the Court held that, in the context of a prison disturbance in which staff use force 
 
258. See JAIME BROWER, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DIAGNOSTIC CTR., DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WELLNESS AND SAFETY LITERATURE REVIEW 1, 5, 10–11 
(2013), available at http://www.dys.ohio.gov/DNN/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=6qSSPqVzbsA%3D 
&tabid=225&mid=1100 (noting that correctional officers are subjected to high levels of stress related 
to factors including the threat of injury from prisoners, the effects of interacting with mentally ill 
prisoners, the nature of the closed work environment, and the need for hypervigilance and self-
control; the average life span of a correctional officer is sixteen years less than the national average 
and suicide rates are substantially higher than among the general working-age population). 
259. COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATE INCARCERATION ET AL., THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 184 ( Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). 
260. Id. at 185. 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 110–112, 222–227. 
          
2015] “THIS EXPERIMENT, SO FATAL” 41 
against prisoners, establishing a violation of the Eighth Amendment required a 
demonstration that force was used maliciously or sadistically.262 In Whitley, the 
Court was careful to distinguish issues regarding the use of force from other 
prison staff concerns, such as medical care, in which there is ordinarily no need to 
balance competing institutional priorities such as the safety of other prisoners.263 
Although in Hudson v. McMillian264 the Supreme Court expanded the reach of the 
“malicious or sadistic” standard by applying it to all cases involving the use of 
force by prison staff, it did not suggest that it was extending that standard to 
security measures other than the use of force.265 Moreover, Farmer v. Brennan 
explicitly applied the “deliberate indifference” standard to all prison conditions of 
confinement.266 
Nonetheless, when prisoners challenge conditions of confinement not 
involving the use of force and the defense contends that the practice or condition 
is justified by security concerns, courts continue to struggle. The clearest analysis 
of this issue is in the en banc case of Jordan v. Gardner.267 Jordan involved women 
prisoners challenging a policy of using male correctional staff to perform pat 
searches of the women that involved touching their clothed breast and crotch 
areas.268 The plaintiffs presented evidence that the searches inflicted grave 
psychological pain because of the women’s histories of physical and sexual 
abuse.269 On the basis of its finding that the searches were unnecessary for 
purposes of security, the district court had concluded that the searches lacked a 
penological justification and enjoined the practice.270 The court of appeals 
affirmed, applying the “deliberate indifference” standard, relying on the fact that 
the infliction of the pain from this practice was not simply a one-time event, and 
that the policy was formulated in the absence of time constraints, so that neither 
Whitley nor Hudson v. McMillian271 controlled.272 The court did not address what 
the outcome would have been if there had been a legitimate security rationale or if 
the decision to conduct such a search had occurred under real time pressures. 
The Eighth Circuit has also grappled with the interaction of security 
concerns with the need to protect prisoner health and safety, in the context of 
challenges to shackling prisoners when such shackling poses health risks. In Haslar 
 
262. See supra note 111; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992) (determining that 
the “malicious or sadistic” standard applied to all uses of force by correctional staff, even in 
circumstances when no use of force was justified). 
263. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). 
264. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 24. 
265. Id. at 6–7. 
266. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
267. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
268. Id. at 1523. 
269. Id. at 1526–27. 
270. Id. at 1527. 
271. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); see supra text accompanying notes 110–112, 
222–227. 
272. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1528. 
          
42 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:1 
v. Megerman,273 the court rejected an appeal from the award of summary judgment 
against a former jail detainee. The detainee, who had suffered permanent injuries 
when he was sent out for medical care because of renal failure, claimed that the jail 
policy on shackling was deliberately indifferent.274 The policy required that 
detainees remain shackled at all times during outside medical treatment.275 At the 
time of the incident, the detainee was almost comatose, and at one point the 
detainee’s legs were so swollen that the shackles could hardly be seen.276 The 
correctional officers guarding the detainee ignored complaints that the shackles 
needed to be removed.277 The county defendants offered evidence that there was 
an unwritten qualification to the policy allowing shackles to be loosened or 
removed when medically necessary.278 On the basis of the unwritten exception, 
the court of appeals held that the policy was neither deliberately indifferent to the 
detainee’s medical needs nor did it impose punishment on a pretrial detainee in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was a reasonable measure to 
prevent escape.279 The court expressly noted that because the correctional officers 
who failed to act were not defendants, it was not commenting on whether the 
actions of the correctional officers might have been deliberately indifferent.280 
As written, and if one is able to suppress doubts about how compelling the 
evidence of unwritten exceptions to the written policy was, Haslar is not an 
extreme decision. In Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services,281 however, the court 
appeared to expand Haslar from approval of a flexible policy that allowed 
unshackling when medically appropriate to blanket approval of a far less nuanced 
shackling policy.282 Nelson involved a prisoner who, pursuant to a general restraint 
policy of the Arkansas Department of Corrections, remained in shackles through 
most of her labor and was reshackled after delivery.283 She filed suit, alleging pain 
and anguish as well as physical injuries from the shackling. A panel of the court of 
appeals held that the district court should have granted summary judgment against 
the plaintiff, reasoning that although she had a serious medical need, the shackling 
policy of the department, as written, lacked an express intent to punish.284 The 
court quoted Haslar in finding that the policy also served a legitimate penological 
purpose: 
A single armed guard often cannot prevent a determined, unrestrained, 
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and sometimes aggressive inmate from escaping without resort to force. 
It is eminently reasonable to prevent escape attempts at the outset by 
restraining hospitalized inmates to their beds[.]285 
The panel decision appears to suggest that a general policy without the 
claimed exceptions relied on in Haslar is equally defensible since it notes that the 
injuries in Haslar were even more serious and the risks of restraint more 
obvious.286 After rehearing en banc, the court of appeals rejected the panel’s 
resolution of the implicit potential conflict between the medical needs of the 
plaintiff and the asserted security justification for the shackling policy.287 The 
court first focused on the Eighth Amendment question and determined that the 
record contained evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff had a 
serious medical need,288 and that the correctional officer knew of the risk posed by 
the need and nonetheless disregarded the need, despite discretion under the state 
policy that would have allowed unshackling.289 The court resolved the claimed 
security justification for shackling by determining that a jury could determine that 
the plaintiff did not present a flight risk, in light of the plaintiff’s physical 
condition, since the officer was experienced and possessed a gun.290 Thus, again 
the court found it unnecessary to confront the possible conflict directly.291 The 
existence of this lurking question nonetheless suggests that plaintiffs challenging 
isolated confinement based on any Eighth Amendment theory should present 
evidence that isolation is unnecessary from a security perspective because 
alternative, financially feasible strategies are equally or more effective in preserving 
security while avoiding the serious risks to prisoners.292 
If, in fact, plaintiffs can effectively address the concerns of judges about 
security issues in cases challenging isolated confinement, they can return to the 
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goal that, ironically enough, the plaintiffs sought in the Madrid v. Gomez case, 
which began this campaign: the abolition of isolated confinement.293 This is a 
propitious time for litigation to evolve from seeking removal of particularly 
vulnerable groups to ending the practice altogether because there is a developing 
consensus of expert opinion that isolated confinement causes serious harm. The 
recent study by the National Academy of Sciences summarizes and endorses the 
research literature finding that serious harm comes from isolated confinement.294 
Among other findings, the study characterizes isolated confinement as an “official 
practice that had not been widely used in the United States for the better part of a 
century.”295 The most significant passages are probably the following: 
There are sound theoretical bases for explaining the adverse effects of 
prison isolation, including the well-documented importance of social 
contact and support for healthy psychological and even physical 
functioning. The psychological risks of sensory and social deprivation are 
well known and have been documented in studies conducted in a range 
of settings, including research on the harmful effects of acute sensory 
deprivation, the psychological distress and other problems that are caused 
by the absence of social contact, and the psychiatric risks of seclusion for 
mental patients. 
*** 
An extensive empirical literature indicates that long-term isolation or 
solitary confinement in prison settings can inflict emotional damage. 
*** 
Some of the social pathologies that are adopted in reaction to and as a 
way of psychologically surviving the extreme rigors and stresses of long-
term segregation can be especially dysfunctional and potentially disabling 
if they persist in the highly social world to which prisoners are expected 
to adjust once they are released.296 
Plaintiffs who seek abolitionist remedies in challenges to the use of isolation 
would be greatly assisted by having access to additional research results on several 
issues. For example, I strongly suspect that in Michigan and in other states the rate 
of unexpected deaths from all causes is significantly higher in isolated confinement 
than it is the general population because prisoners typically have more difficulties 
gaining access to health care while in isolated confinement and because of the 
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physical effects of psychological stress of such confinement.297 The only research 
data that we have on that issue, however, concern the significantly higher risk of 
suicide in isolation.298 Although the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice 
Statistics publishes compilations of deaths in prisons and jails that include some 
demographic information and a reported cause of death where available, they do 
not include information about whether the death took place in general population 
or in isolated confinement, nor do the published data distinguish between 
expected and unexpected deaths.299 Collections of data that allowed comparison 
of unexpected death rates in isolation to deaths in general population, with other 
relevant variables taken into account, could shed substantial additional light on the 
effects of isolated confinement. 
Another research project that would be extremely informative would be the 
replication in other jurisdictions of a study in Washington State. That study 
compared the success in avoiding new felony convictions of prisoners released 
directly from supermax confinement to the community with that of prisoners who 
were reclassified to less restrictive housing prior to their release.300 The study 
found that prisoners released to the community directly from supermax 
confinement committed new felonies much more quickly than did prisoners who 
went through a period of less restrictive confinement prior to release.301 
Moreover, the rate at which direct-release prisoners committed any new felony 
during the period was also significantly higher than for the prisoners who had a 
period in less restrictive confinement.302 
In addition, litigation on this issue should include experts prepared to discuss 
the steps necessary to move prisoners from isolation to general population, 
including a meaningful classification system to allow placement in housing where 
the prisoner can be held safely but without the debilitating effects of isolation. 
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Such a program will require staff retraining and the careful screening of staff.303 It 
will also require the development of a range of treatment programs to support 
mental health and behavioral stability among the survivors of isolated 
confinement.304 Isolated confinement generally appears to be far more expensive 
than housing prisoners in general population,305 so at least a substantial portion of 
the cost of providing necessary treatment would likely be offset by the expected 
large percentage of prisoners who could be safely returned to general population 
immediately or in a relatively short period of time following reclassification.306 
The environment for a return to the Madrid goal has also improved because 
of the enormous energy in the advocacy campaign against solitary confinement. 
Public attitudes towards the treatment of persons convicted of crimes appear to 
have softened in recent years as the skepticism about the wisdom of continuing to 
lock up more people has increased.307 To the extent that the general public is 
exposed to accurate information about the harms occasioned by isolated 
confinement, as well as the lack of evidence that it improves either prison security 
or community safety, they may be even more likely to support such steps, or at 
least less likely to be strongly opposed. 
An across-the-board attack on solitary confinement would necessarily be 
based on the Eighth Amendment, alleging that, taken together, the risks to mental 
and physical health from placement in isolated confinement pose a substantial and 
unreasonable risk of serious harm.308 Such a challenge would have one additional 
argument not available to the plaintiffs in Madrid. In Hope v. Pelzer,309 the Supreme 
Court held that cuffing a prisoner to a hitching post for longer than necessary to 
address an immediate danger or threat violated the Eighth Amendment.310 Several 
things about this decision are relevant to the litigation against solitary 
confinement. 
First, the use of the hitching post, like the use of solitary confinement, raises 
issues about the discretion of prison officials to mandate policies that are justified 
as security needs but also pose risks of harm to prisoners. The Court disposed of 
the security concern by circumscribing the scope of its determination that the use 
of the hitching post amounted to a constitutional violation; it noted that “[a]ny 
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safety concerns had long since abated by the time petitioner was handcuffed to the 
hitching post.”311 At the same time, in describing another case in which a lower 
court upheld the temporary denial of water to a prisoner who was part of a work 
squad, the Court stated that a violation of the Eighth Amendment would have 
occurred if the coercion had jeopardized the prisoner’s health.312 Although this 
statement is dictum, it is a clear rejection of the assumption that security issues 
trump serious risks to prisoner health and safety outside the context of direct use 
of force or emergency security steps. The Court also noted “the clear lack of an 
emergency situation,”313 thus suggesting why Whitley v. Albers314 does not control 
without directly discussing the issue. 
Even more significant is a second feature of Hope. In its analysis of the 
Eighth Amendment issue, the Court first applies the standard “deliberate 
indifference” analysis from Farmer ;315 there is nothing surprising here. In its 
analysis of whether the defendants could employ a qualified immunity defense, 
however, the Court relies in part on something quite different to conclude that the 
Eighth Amendment violation was clearly established: 
The obvious cruelty inherent in this practice should have provided 
respondents with some notice that their alleged conduct violated Hope’s 
constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Hope 
was treated in a way antithetical to human dignity—he was hitched to a 
post for an extended period of time in a position that was painful, and 
under circumstances that were both degrading and dangerous.316 
The suggestion that the fact that a treatment that is “antithetical to human 
dignity” is an independent ground to find a violation of the Eighth Amendment is 
the first hint since Farmer that considerations of human dignity have any relevance 
to determining that prison conditions of confinement are unconstitutional. Hope 
thus acknowledges an older strain of Eighth Amendment law, best represented in 
Trop v. Dulles,317 in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred 
Congress from enacting a statute imposing denaturalization as a punishment for 
wartime desertion from the military.318 In that opinion, the Court adopted a broad 
view of the Eighth Amendment: “While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of 
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civilized standards. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”319 
In contrast, by the time of Farmer, when the Court referred to “evolving 
standards of decency,” it was in the context of explaining the limits of discretion 
of prison officials; allowing prisoners to be beaten or raped inflicts harm without 
any penological justification.320 There is no apparent suggestion that an affront to 
dignity could by itself, without other adverse consequences, violate the Eighth 
Amendment. The opinion in Hope, in contrast, suggests that a court hearing 
evidence about whether prolonged isolated confinement constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment should be open to testimony about the effects of isolated 
confinement that goes beyond the body of literature addressing the propensity of 
such confinement to engender or exacerbate mental illness, but should also allow 
evidence regarding the emotional pain and anguish of isolated confinement, such 
as the effects of living in a tiny cell with no view of a world beyond, day after day 
confined without meaningful activity, physical contact with loved ones, or even 
normal face-to-face conversations with a friend.321 
One can speculate that the Supreme Court found it easier to perceive that 
the use of a hitching post is inconsistent with human dignity because the image of 
hitching posts may provoke the association of such treatment with the use of 
shackles during slavery and the post-Reconstruction forms of social control used 
on African Americans.322 To the extent that the advocacy campaign seeking to end 
the use of solitary confinement can link the practice to some similarly repugnant 
form of punishment, it will be far easier to make the argument that isolated 
confinement, like the use of the hitching post, is antithetical to human dignity. 
Perhaps a comparison to medieval dungeons or animal cages in a traditional zoo 
could serve as an appropriate frame for such advocacy. With that frame for the 
issue of isolated confinement, evidence of the high risk of harm and the safer 
alternatives to the use of solitary confinement might finally locate a more receptive 
judicial audience. When the “fatal experiment” ends and the isolation units 
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